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Introduction
This thesis consists of three papers studying the impact of globalization in the fields of
international trade and finance.
The first chapter studies the how the financial liberalization affects the decisions of both
domestic and foreign investors. It provides the first evidence on the gross capital flows
reactions to the financial sector deregulation. In a panel of 91 countries between 1980
and 2005 I identify the major financial sector reforms and apply difference-in-differences
estimation method to assess their impact on the gross capital flows. I establish four new
stylized facts. First, the financial sector reform is associated with an average increase of
approx. 0.03pp in both gross capital inflows and outflows. Second, the dynamic reaction of
gross capital flows is J-shaped: immediately after the financial sector reform both inflows
and outflows decrease, and in the medium and long term they stabilize at a higher than the
pre-liberalization levels. Third, the analysis of the disaggregated flows reveals that the short
term dynamics is governed solely by the debt flows, while the long term dynamics are driven
by all of the capital flows components: debt, portfolio equity and direct investment. Finally,
I find that only a complex deregulation is successful. Reforming both banking competition
and banking supervision leads to a positive and long-lasting effect whereas reforming banking
competition or banking supervision in isolation displays no or negligible impact. The results
are robust to a wide range of robustness checks.
In the second chapter we address the question of a firm’s production location and product
quality choice. We develop a novel theory to explain the recent phenomenon of reshoring,
i.e. firms moving back their previously offshored business activities. Thanks to the access
to a unique survey of American reshoring firms, we firstly provide the evidence for the
importance of the quality and innovation behind the reshoring decision. Next, building on
Antoniades (2015) we develop a dynamic heterogeneous firms model with quality choice and
offshoring. In the dynamic setting quality choice plays an important role as the production
location decision entails a tradeoff between payroll and quality-related costs. In equilibrium
reshoring decision arises as some firms initially offshore, exploit the increase in profits due
to lower wages and finally return to the domestic country in order to further increase the
quality. Moreover, the model delivers an equilibrium sorting of firms: the most productive
2
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firms will never offshore, the least productive firms will always offshore and the firms with
an intermediate productivity decide to reshore. This paper is a joint work with Barbara
Bratta.
The third chapter provides the new evidence suggesting that a more intensive integra-
tion into global production networks (GVCs) via forward linkages offers a potential for
the increase in the quality of exports, in particular for the developing economies. I relate
the sector-level GVCs participation indicators derived from the international OECD Input-
Output Tables to the data on the unit values of exports at the product-exporter level. The
sample consists of 63 economies between 2000 and 2011. We find a strong association be-
tween the export prices and GVCs forward participation, in particular for the developing
countries. In the most conservative specifications a 1% increase in the forward GVCs partic-
ipation leads to a 0.08% increase in the export unit values, which corresponds to an increase
of 22.6% over the studied period. We document also a less robust negative relationship
between the GVCs backward participation and unit values of exports. The findings suggest
that the driver behind the quality-improving role of the forward linkages are the exports to
the rich markets and technologically advanced sectors.
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This paper provides the first evidence on gross capital flows reactions to the financial sector
deregulation. In the panel of 91 countries between 1980 and 2005 we identify financial
sector reforms and apply difference-in-differences method to assess their impact on gross
capital flows. We establish four new stylized facts: i) Financial sector reform is associated
with an average increase of approx. 0.03pp in both gross capital inflows and outflows. ii)
The dynamic reaction of gross capital flows is J-shaped: immediately after the financial
sector liberalization both inflows and outflows decrease, and in the medium and long term
they stabilize at higher than the pre-liberalization levels. iii) Analysis of the disaggregated
flows reveals that these short term dynamics are governed solely by the debt flows, while
long term dynamics are driven by all: debt, portfolio equity and direct investment flows. iv)
Only a complex deregulation is successful. Reforming both banking competition and banking
supervision leads to positive and long-lasting effects whereas reforming banking competition
or banking supervision in isolation leads to negligible effects. The results are robust to a
wide range of robustness checks.1
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6 Financial Deregulation and Capital Flows
1.1 Introduction
The world economy over the past three decades has become vastly financially integrated.
Since early 1990s we have observed a massive increase in the private capital flows, both
on the assets and liabilities side (Gopinath et al. (2014)). This observation is a worldwide
phenomenon: Lane (2012) reports that the de facto financial integration measured as a
sum of cross-border assets and liabilities (scaled by annual GDP) increased in the period
1980−2007 by 370% for the advanced and by and 40% for the emerging economies. Alongside
the increasing financial integration many countries experienced an unprecedented progress
in the financial development. Trends towards the financial deregulation and privatization
in the banking industry potentially could have had an important impact on the behavior of
domestic and foreign investors, and on the volume and composition of the capital inflows
and outflows. However, the empirical studies of this topic are limited.
The aim of this paper is to study the impact of the financial sector deregulation on gross
capital flow positions, focusing solely on the de jure reforms. In the study we use detailed
financial sector development indicators developed by Abiad et al. (2010) to identify the
countries that underwent a permanent and complex legal deregulation in the banking sector
between 1980 and 2005. Abiad et al. (2010) analyze seven main aspects of the financial
sector deregulation: credit controls, directed credit, interest rate controls, banking sector
entry, privatization, banking supervision and securities market. Each component is scored
on 0−3 scale, where 0 relates to financially repressed areas and score of 2 and above describes
the financially liberalized ones. Any major variability in the index is necessarily linked to
legal regulations that have been undertaken by the government or the central bank. We
identify the major reform episodes in a country as the years in which it has reached liberalized
status for all of the seven components. Excluding the countries which have reverted financial
reforms, we construct the dummy variable representing a permanent banking deregulation.
Next, we run difference-in-differences estimation and analyze the within evolution of the
annual capital inflows and outflows before and after the liberalization year. To control for
capital flows persistence we employ the dynamic panel estimation techniques. We study
the impact of the reform for disaggregated capital flows: debt, portfolio equity and direct
investment. In addition, we construct pulse dummies, which allow to control for short,
medium and long term impact of the reform. Last but not least, we disaggregate the reform
dummy into minor reforms, which we label as the banking competition liberalization and
the strengthening of banking supervision, and investigate the cross-effect of those gradual
reforms.
First, we find that the banking sector deregulation is associated with an average increase of
0.03pp in both capital inflows and outflows as compared to countries that did not undergo any
reform. Second, the dynamic response of the capital flows to the financial reform is J-shaped:
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immediately after the liberalization both inflows and outflows decrease, and in the medium
and long term they stabilize at higher than pre-liberalization levels. On average, within the
first three years after the reform we observe decreases in capital inflows and outflows, all
driven only by debt component. The long term increases arise within 5 or more years after
the reform and involve all components: debt, portfolio equity and direct investment flows.
Third, the deregulatory reforms implemented partially and only in the selected areas of the
banking activity lead to a negligible impact on the capital flows. Countries that deregulate
competition in the financial sector without strengthening the banking supervision or vice
versa observe on average no effect, neither for capital inflows, nor for the outflows. Therefore
we find a strong complementarity among the liberalization efforts, suggesting that only a
complex reforms affect the capital flows.
1.2 Literature Review
Theoretical models of the capital flows often stress the importance of the financial devel-
opment and financial market imperfections. Early work in this area focused on addressing
the Lucas Paradox (Lucas (1990)). Gertler and Rogoff (1990) and by Boyd and Smith
(1997) show that the capital inflows can be lower than the neoclassical model predictions
by emphasizing the role of contractual frictions in the form of limited pledgeability on the
domestic credit market. In a similar manner Matsuyama (2005) provides an intuition that in
a financially underdeveloped economy a large pool of the entrepreneurs with low individual
wealth can give rise to the agency problems, ultimately resulting in a reduced net capital
inflows. On the other hand, Mendoza et al. (2009) develop a model where uncertainty and
asymmetries of information in the financial markets can lead to net capital outflows. Given
the risk that financial intermediaries will misallocate a part of the investment income with-
out the lenders knowing, the residents make higher precautionary savings. Capital outflows
from the developing (i.e. financially underdeveloped) countries can therefore be explained
by the surplus supply of the savings due to the incompleteness of the domestic financial
markets2. However, more recently Martin and Ventura (2015) and Matsuyama (2014) show
theoretically (via different mechanisms) that a reduction in the severity of the contracting
frictions on the financial market can potentially have an ambiguous effects on the capital
flows, with a successful financial reform leading even to the capital outflows. Summing up,
the theory does not point to a unique effect of the improvements in financial development on
the capital flows. To our best knowledge, this paper is the first empirical attempt to asses
those reactions empirically by focusing on the financial sector reforms.
The positive impact of the financial development on the economic growth is generally con-
2Similar ideas are developed in Hubbard (2006) and Prasad et al. (2006).
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firmed in the literature (see Levine (2005) for a comprehensive overview), yet the statement
that the financial development influences the direction of the capital flows has been hard to
corroborate empirically. Most of the studies on the capital flows and financial development
borrow the methodology from cross-sectional growth regressions, including financial devel-
opment proxies as controls. Fernndez-Arias and Hausmann (2000) analyze average capital
inflows in a large sample of countries for years 1996− 1998. They find that the total volume
of capital inflows is positively related to the country’s degree of the financial development as
measured by the private credit to GDP. Reinhardt et al. (2013a) revisit the Lucas Paradox
empirically, highlighting the role of the financial openness. They regress five-year averages of
the current account to GDP over the period 1982-2006 on the financial openness indicators
and a set of controls, finding negative and significant impact of the private credit to GDP.
On the other hand, Gruber and Kamin (2009) using 4-year period averages regress current
account to GDP on various measures of financial development for 60 countries over period
1982-2003, and find them at most weakly significant. Alfaro et al. (2008) explain empirically
the Lucas Paradox by highlighting the role of the institutions. They run a series of cross-
country regressions for (the dependent variable is the net capital inflows per capita, averaged
over the whole sample period) and find no significant impact of the financial development on
the direction of capital flows. In this paper we depart from the cross-country regression set-
ting for a number of reasons. First, the policy questions implied by the theoretical literature
call for a dynamic verification of the effects of the financial sector development. If financial
reforms result in the reductions in financial frictions severity, a suitable empirical setting
should study the changes in the capital flows in the years following the reform rather than
focus on the long-term correlations. Second, an unified cross-country correlations approach
can lead to the overlooking of interesting dynamic patterns in the capital flows reactions to
the financial reforms. To provide support for this intuition, Figure 1.1 plots the evolution of
the average time-demeaned gross capital inflows to GDP for the countries that underwent
a non-reverted complex financial deregulation. There is an interesting dynamics involved:
the capital inflows fall in the first 3 years post-reform and next they stabilize at a higher
than the pre-reform level, suggesting that there can be a significant transitional reaction
of the capital flows3. Therefore, relying solely on the long term averages of foreign assets
and liabilities would overlook this information, whereas the dynamic empirical specification
adopted here allows us to identify short, medium and long term associations between the
capital flows and the financial deregulation.
In addition, recent empirical contributions (Kraay et al. (2005), Gourinchas and Rey (2007),
Broner et al. (2013)) emphasize the importance of the distinction between gross and net
capital flows. As Broner et al. (2013) state:”[...] understanding the behavior of gross capital
3An analogous plot for the capital outflows is presented in the Appendix (Figure 1.4).
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Figure 1.1: The average time-demeaned capital inflow to GDP (country gross inflow minus the
average gross inflow for given year) in the ten years before and after a financial sector deregulation
reform. See the Appendix for details on the reformed countries.
flows seems crucial, especially given that capital flows by foreign and domestic agents have
become very important and are likely driven by different factors.”. In all the regressions we
would study the gross capital inflows and outflows separately4.
Last but not least, this paper is related methodologically to the body of the literature that
applies difference-in-differences estimation in the macroeconomic framework. Some exam-
ples include Slaughter (2001) studying trade liberalization impact on GDP growth, Persson
and Tabellini (2006) who explore democratization and GDP growth, Levchenko et al. (2009)
investigating the financial liberalization effects for the sector-level outcomes. To the best of
our knowledge this is the first paper that looks at the impact of the financial deregulation
on the international capital flows. The empirical strategy adopted here follows directly after
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), a study of the before-after within effects of democrati-
zation on GDP growth.
The reminder of this article is structured as follows: the next section describes the data
and the estimation approach. Section 1.4 reports the main results, section 1.5 presents the
results for the disaggregated capital flows. In section 1.6 we analyze the effect of the partial
reforms. Finally, section 1.7 concludes.
4Where relevant, we presnet also the regressions with net capital inflows as a robustness check.
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1.3 Data and Estimation Strategy
1.3.1 Financial Reforms
The data on the financial deregulation comes from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF)
A New Database of Financial Reforms ( Abiad et al. (2010)). It covers in detail 91 economies
in years 1980−2005. This dataset provides a detailed information about the intensity of the
state intervention into various aspects of the domestic financial sector. Detailed Financial
Liberalization Indices (FLI) cover main 7 areas: credit controls, directed credit, interest
rate controls, banking sector entry, privatization, banking supervision and securities market.
Importantly, the database captures changes only due to a purely legal origin, which in the
liberalization terminology should be classified as de jure changes. That is, any major vari-
ability in the index is necessarily linked to the legal regulations undertook by the government
or by the national central bank. Some example coding questions are: Does the government
allow the entry of new domestic banks? To what extent does the government allow foreign
banks to enter into a domestic market? (banking sector entry), Are both deposit rates and
lending rates are set by the government or subject to ceiling/floor? (interest rate controls),
Are there minimum amounts of credit that must be channeled to certain sectors? (credit
controls).
Within each country the level of the financial market freedom is scored from 0 to 5 with
higher scores standing for less state intervention. The final score is normalized to a 0 − 3
scale. Countries with the scores equal to 1 or less are labeled by the IMF as (partially or
largely) financially repressed, whereas the economies with the scores equal to 2 or higher
are referred to as (partially or largely) financially liberalized. In the baseline approach we
follow the IMF classification. We create the financial reform dummy that takes value one
if a country reaches a sufficiently high score for each sub-component of the FLI (equal or
exceed 2) in each of 7 index components. In detail, this classification results in coding a
country as financially deregulated if each of the following conditions holds:
 Credit Controls: the reserve requirements for the commercial banks are less than
10% of the deposits
 Directed Credit: the mandatory credit allocations to certain sectors are eliminated
or do not exist and the banks do not have to supply credits at the subsidized rates
 Interest Rate Controls: the deposit rates and the lending rates are freed but the
other rates can be subject to a band
 Banking Sector Entry: there are no serious restrictions on foreign and domestic
bank entry, neither on the extent of branching or/and on the range of the financial
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activities
 Privatization: the most banks are privately owned and/or the percentage of the
public bank assets does not exceed 25%
 Securities Market: the securities market is developed and supported by a set of
policies (tax exemptions, introduction of medium and long-term government bonds in
order to build the benchmark of a yield curve, policies to develop corporate bond and
equity markets, or the introduction of a primary dealer system to develop government
security markets) and the foreign equity ownership is allowed
 Banking Supervision: Basel CAR is in force and an objective supervisory agency
is clearly defined and an adequate legal framework to resolve banking problems is
provided; and all banks without any exceptions are under supervision
When any of those conditions is violated, the country would be classified as not financially
liberalized5. Moreover, we need to make sure that the deregulation periods we identify are
permanent and there are no reform reversals. It turns out that the financial reforms are of
a persistent nature and once in force they are very unlikely to be reversed6. In our data
sample there are only three incidences of reform reversals that took place in two countries:
Nigeria and Bolivia (see Table 1.11 in the Appendix for the details). In the robustness
checks we exclude those countries from the analysis, which, however, does not alter the
main findings neither qualitatively, nor quantitatively. Having adopted the financial reform
definition described above, we identify 31 countries that underwent financial deregulation
in the sample7, with the majority of developed economies liberalizing through late 80s and
developing economies liberalizing during late 90s (see Figure 1.2).
1.3.2 Capital Flows
The data source for the gross capital flows is the updated and extended version of the The
external wealth of nations. Mark II database introduced in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
(LMF). It covers the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities for over 100 economies. We focus
on the period 1980−2005 and in order to match the sample coverage for the financial reforms
data we select 91 (developed and developing) countries. Gross capital flows are obtained as
country annual differences in the liabilities or assets, divided by the GDP and expressed in
constant 2005 USD. The major advantages of the LMF dataset are its wide country coverage
5See robustness checks of sensitivity of results to control group composition.
6See Abiad et al. (2010) for similar conclusions.
7Detailed list in Table 1.12 the Appendix.
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Figure 1.2: Financial Reform Events
as well as the methodology behind the construction of the capital stocks. In contrast to the
widely used source on capital flows data, the IMF Financial Database, Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) in the construction of assets stocks use the market prices as opposed to the
nominal prices. As a consequence, their capital stocks series take into account the valuation
effects, i.e. changes in the capital stock due to the capital gains and losses, which happen
to be of a non-negligible size for the majority of the economies (Gopinath et al. (2014)).
1.3.3 Other Control Variables
All the control variables are exhaustively described in section 1.4.2. Summary statistics for
the financial reform measures, capital flows and all the control regressors are presented in
Table 3.14 below.
1.3.4 Estimation Strategy
The methodology applied is a standard difference-in-difference estimation. The baseline
specifications reads:
cflowit = φt + αi + βFREFORMit + Γ
′Xit + it (1.3.1)
where cflowit are respectively capital inflows or outflows, φt stands for the year fixed effects,
αi are the country fixed effects, Xit includes a vector of the relevant controls and β is the
coefficient of interest. The variable FREFORM takes value 1 in the year of the financial
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Variable; source mean sd min max N
The External Wealth of Nations Dataset; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
C.Inflows (total) to GDP .076 .220 -1.231 4.133 2191
C.Outflows (total) to GDP .070 .214 -1.061 3.960 2191
C.Outflows (debt) to GDP .036 .136 -.949 2.350 2192
C.Outflows (debt) to GDP .036 .136 -.949 2.350 2192
C.Inflows (FDI) to GDP .025 .085 -.540 2.188 2194
C.Outflows (FDI) to GDP .012 .059 -.269 1.679 2192
C.Inflows (equity) to GDP .013 .068 -.589 1.113 2182
C.Outflows (equity) to GDP .010 .048 -.169 .887 2167
IMF Financial Reform Database (IMF Fin. Reform); Abiad and Detragiche (2010)
Financial Reform Index (normalized), 0 to 1 .562 .285 0 1 2220
Dir. credit and reserve requirements 1.738 1.105 0 3 2220
Credit controld and agg. credit ceilings 2.267 1.322 0 3 2220
Int’l rate controls 2.101 1.202 0 3 2220
Entry barriers 2.046 1.095 0 3 2220
Banking Supervision .992 .991 0 3 2220
Privatization 1.337 1.194 0 3 2220
Security Markets 1.682 1.086 0 3 2220
Control variables
GDP per capita; PWT, WB WDI 9752.778 8671.715 365.182 36906.75 2243
Fin. Openness; Chinn and Ito (2006) .217 1.579 -1.864 2.439 2158
Fin. Openness normalized; Chinn and Ito (2006) .484 .367 0 1 2158
Priv. credit to GDP; WB FD 44.489 38.773 .465 198.054 2010
Trade Openness; Quinn (1997), IMF Stat’s .689 .274 .125 1 2253
Trade volume to GDP; WB WDI, IMF Stat’s 82.027 102.316 10.482 1375.661 2190
Ex. rate regime; Ilzetzki and Reinhart (2004) 2.513 1.203 1 4 2116
Capital Acc. Controls; Quinn (1997) .634 .283 .125 1 2193
Int’l capital flow controls; IMF Fin.Reform 1.872 1.097 0 3 2246
Freedom House Index; Freedom House 6.642 3.109 .250 10 2180
ICRG Composite Index; The PRS Group 68.136 13.492 25.375 95.417 1889
PWT: Penn World Tables; WB WDI: World Bank Development Indicators; WB FD: World Bank Financial Development
Database; IMF Stat’s: International Monetary Fund Statistics; ICRG: International Country Risk Guide.
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deregulation reform and remains 1 forever. Therefore β identifies the average annual effect
of the financial reform on the capital flows as compared to the general patterns of capital
flows in the countries that did not undergo a large-scale reform.
The past values of capital inflows and outflows are likely drivers of their current levels. In
order to account for that, we would also estimate a variant of specification (1.3.1) including
lags of the dependent variable:
cflowit = φt + αi + δcflowit−1 + βFREFORMit + Γ′Xit + it (1.3.2)
The specification (1.3.2) is subject to the dynamic panel data bias, even in the unlikely case
when all of the control regressors are uncorrelated with fixed effects and strictly exogenous.
To account for that we estimate (1.3.2) with a Blundell-Bond system-GMM methods.8
The difference-in-difference (D-in-D) approach as presented in (1.3.1) and (1.3.2) relies on
a couple of assumptions. First, for establishing the causality, the timing of the financial
reform should be random across the countries. This assumption may appear restrictive, as
one can imagine that the financial sector reforms materialize, for instance, as an outcome of
a prolonged wave of increased capital inflows or outflows. How this possibility can affect the
estimates remains however unclear. If indeed the financial deregulation reforms happen at
the onset of a period of the increased capital inflows, then the estimates are biased upwards.
On the other hand, if in the anticipation of the financial reforms foreign investors increase
their investments, then the estimates are biased downwards. To diagnose this possibility
in addition to specification (1.3.1) we also estimate a specification accounting for the time-
varying effects of financial deregulation:




′Xit + it (1.3.3)
Equation (1.3.3) is a flexible model that includes lags and leads of the financial reform
dummy. We define 5 pulse variables, Djit, which would capture the anticipation effects as
well as any dynamics in the post-reform period. In chronological order: D1it = 1 in fifth to
third year before the reform and D2it = 1 in second and first year before the reform, D
3
it = 1
in the year of the reform and in two following years, D4it = 1 in third and fourth year after
the reform and, finally, D5it = 1 in fifth or further years after the reform. The estimated
8As Blundell et al. (2000) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show in the context of dynamic panel data
models, for a highly persistent processes past changes may be predictive of the current levels, while the past
levels are weak IVs for the current changes. In those cases the system GMM estimator has much greater
precision in estimating the autoregressive parameters than a difference GMM one. Given that cflowit in
the analyzed period have documented to be of a relatively high persistence, we resort to system GMM while
estimating (1.3.2).
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effect should be interpreted in reference to capital flows levels prior to five years before the
major deregulation.
As already mentioned, this approach allows also to investigate the time dynamics of the
effect of the reform. In detail, the effect of the D-in-D estimate from specification (1.3.1)
is capturing the permanent impact of the financial deregulation. In other words, D-in-D is
comparing the post-liberalization capital flows averages with their pre-reform counterparts
between treated and control countries. In principle, the mean estimate could admit a very
different time dynamics behind. For instance, a large-scale deregulation in the financial
sector could trigger large positive effects right on impact and minor or negligible effects af-
terwards, or inversely - on impact the capital flows could react negatively and only after a
couple of periods after the changes had been implemented positive effects materialize. Both
of those scenarios could lead to the same mean post-reform estimate. The flexible specifica-
tion provides insight into the dynamics of post-reform scenario.
Last but not least, the critical requirement for establishing causality within the D-in-D
framework is the assumption of the parallel trend, i.e. we should observe the same dynamics
governing both the control and the treated group in the pre-treatment period. Specification
(1.3.3) provides itself a test for any violations of the parallel trend assumption. As additional
robustness checks we conduct a couple of placebo tests and include also the country-specific
time trends on top of the country and year fixed effects (reported in section 1.4.3). Finally,
an implicit assumption is that conditional on country and year fixed effects, the reform
dummy should be uncorrelated with other time-varying factors (included in the error, it).
To address this issue, we control for the time-varying observable factors that potentially
affect the capital flows levels and for the regional trends.
Apart from the identification assumptions, the reader should bear in mind that given the
coding rule of the financial reform dummy9, any minor changes in the financial sector regu-
lation that had happened before the large-scale deregulation are automatically disregarded.
Certainly, a priori, there is no reason to think that those changes do not influence the pat-
terns of capital flows. In order to investigate the potential impact of the minor deregulatory
efforts on the capital flows, I split the main financial reform dummy and analyze the effects
of the more disaggregated indices. This is discussed in section 1.6.
9A country is coded as the permanent reformer if all of the considered FLI components reach sufficiently
high levels.
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1.4 Main Results
1.4.1 Baseline Results
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 combine the baseline estimation results of the specifications (1.3.1) to
(1.3.3) run without control variables, both for the capital inflows and outflows10. In Col. (1)
we present the basic OLS estimates, whereas in Col. (2) we additionally control for the year
fixed effects. Col. (3) − (5) report difference-in-differences (DD) estimates (i.e. including
year and country fixed effects) with the last two columns additionally controlling for the
lagged values of capital flows. Finally, in Col. (6) − (7) we report the outcomes of the
estimation of the flexible specification from Eq.(1.3.3).11
Overall, the impact of financial reform is positive both for the outflows and inflows, and
significant. The countries that underwent a complex deregulation in the banking sector at
time t have seen an unconditional increase of 0.065pp and 0.047pp in gross capital inflows
and outflows with respect to the countries that did not undergo the reforms until that time
(based on the most conservative estimates; Col.(5)). Controlling for the country and year
fixed effects, as well as the inclusion of the lagged values of the dependent variable decreases
the magnitude of the coefficient, which falls from 0.209 in the OLS specification to 0.097 in
the baseline D-in-D. However, interestingly, the GMM estimation results in an increase of
the FREFORM coefficient (from 0.045 to 0.064 for the inflows and from 0.035 t 0.047 for
the outflows; Col. (4)− (5)), which suggests a downward bias in the dynamic specification.
In Col. (5) − (6) we investigate the time dynamics of the financial deregulation. First, we
see that the data does not suggest any serious violations of the parallel trend assumption.
In the case of capital inflows, in the pre-reform period we see only a weakly significant (at
10% level) positive impact between 2 to 1 year prior to the reform. This could suggest some
anticipatory shocks preceding the reform. In the case of capital outflows the anticipatory
effects lose significance when system GMM estimation is applied. Second, we learn that the
reform does not bring any significant results immediately and the major positive increases
driving the mean estimates, symmetrically for the capital inflows and outflows, arise in the
longer term. Interestingly, in the first 2 years after the reform capital flows fall by 0.08pp
and start to increase monotonically afterwards. This J-shaped pattern is common both to
10Table 1.13 in the Appendix presents the results for the net capital inflows. Overall, there is no statistically
significant impact of the reform on the net capital inflows. However, there is a weakly significant (at 10%
level) impact of the reform in the period up to 2 years before and until 2 years after the reform, equal to
0.025pp and 0.028pp (resp.) increase in the net inflows. We find similar weakly significant anticipatory effect
for both inflows and outflows, which however disappears in the specification with a full set of country-level
controls.
11Col. (5) and (7), in contrast to Col.(4) and (6), respectively, are estimated with Blundell-Bond system-
GMM methods, correcting for the dynamic panel data bias.
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Table 1.2: Financial Reform and Capital Inflows
OLS Year FE Difference in differences (Year FE + Country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM 0.209∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.0969∗∗ 0.0448∗∗∗ 0.0644∗∗∗
(.0518) (.0514) (.0448) (.0152) (.017)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years 0.00728 0.000745
(.00775) (.00484)
2 to 1 year 0.0298∗ 0.0165∗
(.0172) (.00918)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years -0.0169∗ -0.0177∗
(.0126) (.0107)
3 to 4 years 0.0592∗ 0.0432∗
(.03) (.0213)
5+ years 0.0957∗∗∗ 0.0882∗∗∗
(.0235) (.0266)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No No No No
Lagged cflow No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2318 2318 2318 2227 2227 2227 2227
Countries 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
R2-adj. .12 .2 .38 .57 .58 .57 .58
No. of instruments 55 58
AR-1/AR-2 p-values .012 / .43 .01 / .16
Hansen J p-value .41 .45
Dep. var: gross capital inflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)
and (7) split the outcome of col. (4) and (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of
instrument validity. AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences
equations. Standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
capital outflows and inflows, and absent in the case of net capital inflows (See Table 1.13 in
the Appendix).
1.4.2 Conditional Results
In this section we present the estimation results of specifications from Eq.(1.3.1)-(1.3.3),
with a rich set of control variables. Firstly, in order to net off the effect of the reform
from the other possible determinants of capital flows related to the financial sector, we
control for the level of financial openness in each country, measured by the Chinn-Ito index
(Chinn and Ito (2006)). The index summarizes the level of capital account openness based
on the restrictions on the cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Additionally,
we control explicitly for the country-level capital account restrictions based on the IMF
Financial Development Database. To account for the trade intensity and trade volumes
impact on capital flows, we include as regressors trade volume to GDP (calculated as total
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Table 1.3: Financial Reform and Capital Outflows
OLS Year FE Difference in differences (Year FE + Country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM 0.204∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗ 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0466∗∗∗
(.0545) (.0545) (.0446) (.0132) (.0139)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years -0.000891 -0.0101
(.00531) (.00916)
2 to 1 year 0.0276∗ -0.00668
(.0165) (.0143)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years -0.0464∗∗∗ -0.0341∗∗∗
(.0191) (.0121)
3 to 4 years 0.0301 0.0199
(.0246) (.0271)
5+ years 0.0878∗∗∗ 0.0599∗∗∗
(.0239) (.0154)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No No No No
Lagged cflow No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2318 2318 2318 2227 2227 2227 2227
Countries 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
R2-adj. .12 .19 .44 .65 .68 .66 .68
No. of instruments 55 58
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .042 / .18 .045/ .56
Hansen J p-value .37 .89
Dep. var: gross capital outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)
and (7) split the outcome of col. (4) and (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of
instrument validity. AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences
equations. Standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
exports plus total imports over GDP) as well as an index of trade openness. Trade openness
is a summary measure of the severity of both explicit and implicit tariffs, and other non-
tariff trade restrictions. We also control for the country level of development proxied by
log of GDP per capita. Trade variables and the other macroeconomic statistics come from
the IMF Statistics and World Bank World Development Indicators or Penn World Tables.
Alfaro et al. (2008) stress the importance of the institutional quality as the main driver
behind the decisions of foreign as well as the domestic investors. To account for the role of
institutional framework we introduce a Composite Index based on International Country Risk
Guide data (ICRG). The IRCG Composite Index from the PBS Group12 is the sum of the
indices of investment profile, government stability, internal and external conflict, corruption,
non-militarized politics, protection from religious tensions, law and order, protection from
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality. This index can take
12The PRS Group is the former group of editors and analysts from ”International Reports”, where in
1980 they have developed a statistical model to assess countries’ risk based on a given country forecast of
its financial, economic and political risks.
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values from 0 to 100 for each country, where a higher score means a lower risk. Moreover, the
recent literature suggests (Magud et al. (2014)) that the exchange rate regime can impact the
volume and frequencies of capital flows. We thus control for the exchange rate regime based
on an updated classification from Ilzetzki and Reinhart (2004). The classification ranges
from 1 to 4, with 4 standing for the fully free exchange rate regime. Summary statistics for
all those variables are reported in section 1.3.3.
Table 1.4: Financial Reform and Capital Inflows
OLS Year FE Difference in differences (Year FE + Country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM 0.118∗∗∗ 0.0932∗∗ 0.0243∗∗ 0.0121∗ 0.0348∗∗∗
(.0415) (.0415) (.0109) (.0101) (.0128)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years 0.0120 0.0130
(.0113) (.00813)
2 to 1 year 0.00924 0.00878
(.0163) (.0124)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years -0.0265∗∗ -0.0242∗∗∗
(.0112) (.00808)
3 to 4 years 0.00418 0.00800
(.0263) (.0238)
5+ years 0.0406∗∗ 0.0801∗∗∗
(.0169) (.0255)
Fin. Openness 0.0102∗∗ 0.00807 0.0156∗∗ 0.00845∗∗ 0.00496∗ 0.00853∗∗ 0.00795∗∗∗
(.00495) (.00489) (.00753) (.00391) (.00278) (.00394) (.00282)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.00220 -0.00658 -0.0106 -0.00443 -0.00298 -0.00266 -0.00287
(.00671) (.00723) (.00967) (.00435) (.00322) (.00416) (.00338)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.0214∗∗ -0.0188∗ -0.0117∗ -0.00470 -0.00754∗∗ -0.00465 -0.00695∗∗
(.00988) (.00974) (.00671) (.00396) (.00303) (.0038) (.003)
ICRG Composite 0.0224∗∗ 0.0257∗∗∗ 0.000628 -0.000183 0.0101∗∗∗ -0.000915 0.00987∗∗
(.00891) (.00938) (.00813) (.00464) (.00365) (.00451) (.00387)
Trade volume to gdp 0.000295 0.000247 0.00185∗∗ 0.000980∗∗∗ 0.000143 0.000904∗∗∗ 0.000161
(.000229) (.0002) (.000868) (.000326) (.000109) (.000324) (.000109)
Trade Openness -0.0189 -0.0172 -0.0167 -0.00917 -0.00879 0.0000474 -0.00855
(.0262) (.0268) (.039) (.0231) (.0141) (.0213) (.0144)
ln GDP p.c. 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.149∗ 0.0792∗∗ 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0805∗∗ 0.0190∗∗∗
(.00598) (.00644) (.0861) (.0356) (.00461) (.034) (.0052)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1742 1742 1742 1741 1741 1741 1741
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .23 .32 .57 .68 .70 .68 .70
No. of instruments 60 64
AR-1/AR-2 p-values .0013 / .98 .0014 / .97
Hansen J p-value .69 .63
Dep. var: gross capital inflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)− (7)
split the outcome of col. (4)− (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity.
AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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On average, net off all the other capital inflow determinants, the financial sector reform
results in an increase of 0.035pp in capital inflows (Table 1.4, Col.(5)). The effect for the
capital outflows is almost identical - an increase of 0.031pp (Table 1.4, Col.(5)). Regarding the
dynamic response of capital flows to financial reform, we find a corroboration of the J-shaped
response present in the unconditional results. On impact, within the first 2 years of the reform
we see a drop of 0.024pp in inflows and 0.017pp in outflows (Col. (7)). The coefficients
describing the period of 3 to 4 years after the reform are positive, yet not significant. The
main positive effect from the mean estimate is driven by the capital flows increases arriving
mostly from the long term gains, starting from 5 years after the reform and onward (0.08pp
for inflows and 0.052pp for outflows; Col. (7)).
A significant role of any of the pulse dummies from the pre-reform period would point
to a potential violation to common trend assumption or a presence of confounding factors
affecting both the capital flows and financial reforms, and as such posing a threat to the
causal inference. None of those pulse dummies remains significant, neither for the inflows,
nor for the outflows. We further inspect the possible violations to parallel trend assumption
via a set of placebo tests in section 1.4.3.
In the light of the recent research on the gross capital flows those symmetric results do not
come as a surprise. Broner et al. (2013) document a number of stylized facts regarding the
behavior of gross capital inflows and outflows. They find that the total gross inflows and
outflows are highly correlated and tend to comove, both under regular economic conditions
as well as in crisis times.13
As for the controls, as expected capital flows are positively correlated with financial openness
(Fin.Openness), which is in line with the recent empirical studies of capital flows (Reinhardt
et al. (2013b)). Interestingly, controls of the explicit capital account (Cap.Ctrls(IMF ))
are not significant. Trade volume is generally positively related to capital flows, yet it is
significant in 3 out of 7 specifications. We find the trade openness to be negatively correlated
with capital flows, reflecting the notion that both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade act
as a deterrent for capital inflows and outflows. Interestingly, trade openness coefficients are
of a greater magnitude and more significant for the capital outflows. Both flows are strongly
and positively correlated with log of the GDP per capita, suggesting the richer economies
are more attractive for foreign investors as well as the domestic investors in richer economies
locate more funds abroad.14 The lower institutional risk, the higher both capital flows as
13Broner et al. (2013) find also a more heterogeneous behavior in the components of capital flows, which
is also in line with the results of the section 1.5 of this paper.
14The results for net capital inflows are presented in Table 1.14. As in the case of unconditional regression,
we do not find any impact of financial reform on net capital inflows. Perhaps surprisingly, we find only a
weak corroboration of the Lucas paradox: the log of the GDP per capita correlates positively with net capital
inflows, however it is weakly significant (at 10% level) only in 2 out of 7 specifications.
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Table 1.5: Financial Reform and Capital Outflows
OLS Year FE Difference in differences (Year FE + Country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM 0.122∗∗∗ 0.0981∗∗ 0.0259 0.0154∗ 0.0310∗∗∗
(.0432) (.0436) (.0191) (.0092) (.0108)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years -0.0141 0.0132
(.00999) (.0661)
2 to 1 year 0.0179 0.0175
(.0129) (.0197)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years -0.0223∗∗ -0.0169∗∗
(.00977) (.00671)
3 to 4 years -0.00219 0.00315
(.0175) (.0197)
5+ years 0.0404∗∗∗ 0.0523∗∗∗
(.0133) (.0159)
Fin. Openness 0.0104∗∗ 0.00904∗ 0.0106 0.00455 0.00283 0.00489∗ 0.00545∗∗∗
(.00487) (.00463) (.00682) (.00279) (.00173) (.00279) (.00182)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.00567 -0.0113∗ -0.0126 -0.00505 -0.00360 -0.00349 -0.00351
(.00599) (.00648) (.00912) (.00364) (.00224) (.00331) (.00241)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.0161 -0.0139 -0.00295 0.00140 -0.00227 0.00158 -0.00168
(.0104) (.0103) (.00586) (.00266) (.00238) (.00243) (.00228)
ICRG Composite 0.0214∗∗ 0.0234∗∗ -0.000943 -0.000345 0.00678∗∗ -0.00122 0.00649∗∗
(.00903) (.00939) (.00701) (.00359) (.00318) (.00342) (.00321)
Trade volume to gdp 0.000228 0.000181 0.00149∗ 0.000643∗∗ 0.0000803 0.000570∗∗ 0.0000948
(.000254) (.000225) (.00082) (.000254) (.0000809) (.000247) (.0000793)
Trade Openness -0.0343 -0.0354 -0.0596∗ -0.0317∗∗ -0.0181∗∗ -0.0237∗ -0.0173∗
(.0259) (.0246) (.0322) (.0153) (.00868) (.0134) (.0092)
ln GDP p.c. 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0273∗∗∗ 0.111 0.0478∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0494∗ 0.0149∗∗∗
(.00637) (.00687) (.0789) (.0272) (.00313) (.0259) (.00363)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1742 1742 1742 1741 1741 1741 1741
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .23 .3 .61 .75 .81 .75 .80
No. of instruments 60 64
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .016 / .39 .016 / .39
Hansen J p-value .23 .16
Dep. var: gross capital outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)− (7)
split the outcome of col. (4)− (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity.
AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
22 Financial Deregulation and Capital Flows
ICRGComposite variable enters the regression with positive and significant sign. Exchange
rate regime (EER; Ex.RateRegime) coefficient is negative, suggesting more capital flowing
in and out of the economies with a more rigid ERR. However, it is only significant for capital
inflows.
1.4.3 Sensitivity checks
In order to test the sensitivity of the results described in the sections above, we run a number
of robustness checks. First, as capital flow surges and sudden stops has been associated with
credit cycles, we enrich the specifications by controlling for the financial sector depth proxied
by private credit to GDP (data from World Bank Financial Development Database). Results
can be found in 1.15 and 1.19 in the Appendix. Although the coefficient on the private credit
is positive and significant both for capital inflows and outflows, it does not alter neither the
mean impact of the reform, nor its dynamic pattern.15 Also, as suggested by Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2013) we control not only for the levles of GDP per capita, but also for the
GDP growth rates (data from the World Bank World Development Indicators; results in
Tables 1.16 and 1.20 in the Appendix). Again, we find no changes to the mean and time-
varying coefficients of the financial reform. Finally, we also exchange the institutional quality
variable, ICRGComposite, for the Freedom House Index (FH Index) that is measuring the
quality of democratic institutions. Freedom House Index ranges from 0 to 10, with a higher
value representing a higher quality of the institutions. In the empirical studies of the effects
of the democracy this variable is typically the least preferred among all the measures of the
quality of the democracy (as compared to Polity IV or the Goldman dataset), as it is the
most contaminated with the pooled information on the overall condition of the all institutions
within a country. However, this drawback acts to our advantage as the overall quality of the
institutions is precisely what we want to control for. The inclusion of the FHIndex does
not change the sign, neither the significance of the FREFORM coefficients, nor the capital
flows dynamic patterns after the reform.
The main results remain robust to dropping from the sample countries that are hosts to
large financial centers such as United States and United Kingdom, Switzerland, Hong Kong
and Singapore as well as to the exclusion of China (Tables 1.15 - 1.22 in the Appendix).
Finally, we conduct two placebo experiments in order to search for any violations to the
parallel trend assumption. For each country that has witnessed a financial reform, we lag the
actual reform year by 5 and 7 years, respectively. The results are reported in the first four
columns of Table 1.6 below. Any significant estimates in the lagged-reform specifications
15This remians true even for the specifications where private credit to GDP is traeted as endogenous and
instrumented for in the system-GMM estimation.
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Table 1.6: Identification assumption tests
CAPITAL INFLOWS
[Placebo 1] [Placebo 2] [Ctry-specific time trends]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FREFORM 0.0488 0.0117 0.0468 0.0115 0.0594∗∗ 0.0255∗∗∗
(.044) (.0665) (.0432) (.0574) (.025) (.0029)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1874 1414 1874 1414 2212 1741
Countries 91 82 91 82 91 84
R2-adj. .52 .78 .42 .68 .79 .87
No. of instruments 55 59 55 59 55 59
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .0013 / .78 .0027 / .73 .00042 / .75 .00065 / .75 .011 / .43 .00068 / .89
Hansen J p-value 0.12 0.93 0.11 0.91 0.67 0.3
CAPITAL OUTFLOWS
FREFORM 0.0368 0.00386 0.0362 0.00622 0.036∗∗ 0.031∗∗
(.0342) (.00466) (0.0337) (.00409) (.017) (.0108)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1874 1414 1874 1414 2212 1741
Countries 91 82 91 82 91 84
R2-adj. .51 .76 .45 .63 .80 .91
No. of instruments 55 59 55 59 55 59
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values 0.000034 / 0.5 .00014 / 0.54 0.000034 / 0.49 .00015 / 0.54 .031 / .29 .0047 /.41
Hansen J p-value 0.29 .27 0.25 .24 .62 .66
Dep. var: gross capital inflows/outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. In [Placebo 1] specifications FREFROM dummy is lagged by 5
years across the reformed countries, in [Placebo 2] FREFROM dummy is lagged by 7 years. In [Ctry-specific time trends] specifications
country-specific time trends are included. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. AR-1/AR-2 are the
p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors clustered at the country
∗ level. p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
would suggest that the capital flows trends had been different for the treated and the control
group already before the reform took place or/and that there exist confounding factors
affecting both the financial reforms and capital flows undermining any casual conclusions.
We find that the lagged reform estimates are not significant neither for the capital inflows,
nor for the outflows. This is true both for the unconditional specifications (Col.(1) and (3))
as well as for the specifications with full set of controls (Col.(2) and (4)). In the last two
columns we additionally include the country-specific time trends. This would account not
only for the fact that some countries may attract more inflows than the others on average,
but also for the fact that in some economies capital flows may exhibit also different time
trends. Controlling for time trends does not change the results neither qualitatively, not
quantitatively, both for the inflows and the outflows (Col.(5) and .(6)).
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1.5 FDI, debt and portfolio equity flows
The LMF data allows for splitting gross capital flows into three composition categories:
debt flows, portfolio equity and direct investment (FDI). Using this classification, we re-
estimate (1.3.1)-(1.3.3) with an aim to investigate potentially differential impact of financial
liberalization on different capital flows components as well as in order to determine the
driving flows components behind the dynamic patterns documented in the previous sections.
For the sake of clarity of the exposition, we report only the outcomes of the most conservative
system-GMM coefficients. Table 1.7 summarizes the results for both capital outflows and
inflows.
We find the previously identified positive effect of the financial reform on the capital
inflows is present only for the debt and portfolio equity flows, with no effect for FDI. Countries
that have undergone financial liberalization face on average 0.02pp and 0.012pp higher inflows
of debt and portfolio equity, respectively (Col. (3) and (5)). Dynamic patterns from the
previous section are confirmed: the positive mean effect is driven by the long term impact
of the reform, arising approximately 5 years after a large scale deregulation. However, the
initial drop in gross total capital flows is entirely due to debt flows, the short and mid-
term coefficient for portfolio equity remain insignificant (but positive). On the other hand,
financial reform increases all of the capital outflows components on average (lower panel,
Table 1.7), with the largest impact on the gross outward FDI (FDI coefficient is equal to
0.0831 as opposed to 0.016 and 0.011 for debt and portfolio equity). As in the case of the
outflows, all positive impact materializes in the long-term, from 5 years after the reform.
Similarly to the inflows behavior, it is the debt outflows component driving the drop in total
outflows in the first two years after the reform. In all but one of the specifications the pre-
reform dummies are insignificant, suggesting no violations of the parallel trend assumption.
It is only in the case of debt inflows that we find statistically significant anticipatory negative
effect of the financial reform, which then carries on up until the first 2 years after the
liberalization. The results from Table 1.7 also suggest that the total gross capital flows
reaction patterns in the short term are not driven by substitution between various types of
assets. Indeed, at the same time when the debt flows fall in the initial years after the large-
scale financial liberalization, the coefficients on both portfolio equity and direct investment
remain positive, yet not significant.
In Tables 1.23 and 1.24 in the Appendix we present the full estimation results for all
the components of the capital flows. Additionally, in Table 1.25 we document the regression
coefficients for the net inflows split by components.
It is possible that a financial reform increases the domestic supply of credit and therefore,
the home residents begin to substitute the foreign debt with its domestic (now more available)
counterpart, which leads to the fall in the foreign debt inflows. On the other hand, the
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Table 1.7: Financial Reform and Capital Inflows: FDI, debt and equity flows
CAPITAL INFLOWS
Direct Investment Debt Flows Portfolio Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FREFORM 0.00674 0.0199∗∗ 0.0120∗∗
(.00454) (.00845) (.00559)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years 0.00266 0.0106 0.0487
(.00213) (.01606) (.0231)
2 to 1 year 0.00929 -0.0203∗∗∗ 0.0300
(.00946) (.0075) (.0469)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years 0.000394 -0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0260
(.00346) (.00486) (.0448)
3 to 4 years 0.0140 -0.0150 0.0113
(.0131) (.0129) (.0829)
5+ years 0.00133 0.0535∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗
(.00192) (.00604) (.00758)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741 1733 1733
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .4 .4 .59 .59 .43 .43
No. of instruments 60 64 60 64 60 64
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .00051/ .69 .00051 / .87 .00048 / .43 .00059 / .28 .023 / .29 .023 /.44
Hansen J p-value .30 .15 .31 .25 .56 .23
CAPITAL OUTFLOWS
FREFORM 0.0831∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗
(.00255) (.00739) (.00378)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years 0.00305 0.00876 0.00405
(.0147) (.0425) (.0197)
2 to 1 year 0.00350 0.0160 -0.0218
(.0191) (.0685) (.0285)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years 0.0495 -0.0117∗∗ 0.0490
(.0446) (.00504) (.0349)
3 to 4 years 0.0236 -0.00925 0.0476
(.0823) (.0148) (.0597)
5+ years 0.0417∗∗∗ 0.0491∗∗ 0.0407∗∗
(.0017) (.00353) (.00123)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741 1717 1717
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. 0.53 0.53 0.69 0.69 0.5 0.49
No. of instruments 60 64 60 64 60 64
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .0029 / .89 .0032 / .87 .022 / .95 .023 / .94 .041 / .38 .041 / .38
Hansen J p-value .47 .62 .13 .28 .17 .19
Dep. var: gross capital inflows/outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (2),
(4), (6) split the outcome of col. (1), (3), (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument
validity. AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard
errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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explanation for the the fall in debt outflows is more demanding. It could be lead by an
increase in the uncertainty brought about by the large-scale reforms. The lending capacities
of domestic residents can be reduced in the first years after the reforms, causing a transitional
fall in the debt outflows. Alternatively, the explanation could be based on the theory recently
developed by Martin and Ventura (2015). Assuming that in the reforming economy there
are relatively symmetric pools of low productivity firms and high productivity firms, we
would observe that after the liberalization the unproductive firms exit the market and free
resources for the high productivity firms. If the newly available funds are entirely absorbed
by the demand from the surviving firms, the interest rate increases and debt outflows fall in
response. However, this effect is temporary and once the reform-induced resource reallocation
takes place, the capital outflows begin to increase again. In the long run, the financial reforms
materialize in the form of more solid, grown and international banking system and increased
credibility of local financial institutions. This both facilitates more exchange on international
markets within domestic investors (long term increases in gross outflows) and increases the
attractiveness of the country for the foreign investors (long term increases in gross inflows).
1.6 Complementary reforms
The liberalization of the financial sector usually comprises a package of numerous reforms
and countries can differ in the pace, the order and the intensity of their implementation.
Some countries start the liberalization efforts by limiting the state intervention in credit
regulations, some others instead decide to strengthen the financial supervision bodies or turn
to freeing and developing the securities. So far, in the analysis presented in the previous
sections we have treated all those reforms equally. However, in principle, there is no reason
why the reforms adopted in distinct areas of the financial sector should have an identical
impact on the incentives of the foreign and domestic investors. Martin and Taddei (2013)
in their recent theoretical contribution point to the fact that if we want to understand the
relationship between capital flows and the condition of the financial sector, we should be
very specific about the type of frictions we address. In detail, they show that a reduction
in the financial frictions can lead to a very different reactions of the capital flows depending
whether we reduce the adverse selection or limited pledgeability problems.
In Figure 1.3 we plot the evolution of Financial Liberalization Index by its components.
A pattern that clearly emerges is that the reforms within securities markets and banking
supervision importantly lagged behind the liberalization efforts in the remaining areas.
Motivated by those both theoretical and empirical considerations, we want to separate the
reforms aimed at increasing competition as opposed to the reforms strengthening the su-
pervision and transparency. Is more competition in the banking sector complementary to
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Figure 1.3: Financial Liberalization Index components: cross-country averages.
improving the legal supervision powers over the banking industry? Are the effects of freeing
competition, opening to foreign financial companies and strengthening the supervisory net-
work purely additive? Or maybe a strong banking transparency fosters the positive effects of
increasing competition? Is liberalization in the banking competition without strengthening
a supervisory network beneficial for capital flows? These are the type of questions we will
try to address in this section.
As previously, in the reform coding we rely on The New Database of Financial Reforms.
However now, we will consider the sub-indices in the areas of credit controls, directed credit,
interest rate controls, banking sector entry and privatization as the ones describing financial
competition. Respectively, sub-indices measuring banking supervision and securities market
would jointly describe the financial transparency. We split the sample into countries that
underwent both transparency and competition reforms, the countries that underwent only
one of those reforms and the countries that did not undergo any reforms whatsoever (the
baseline reference group).16
16According to the coarse codification of reforms applied in the previous sections we have identified 32
countries that have undergone a major financial deregulation. In a finer codification applied in this section
we additionally identify further 32 countries that have undergone a banking competition reform and 6 that
have reformed banking supervision. The control group consists of 14 countries. In principle, one would want
to focus on each of the FLI indices separately, however such an approach would not be feasible within the
adopted difference-in-differences framework as it would critically reduce the number of observations in the
control group.
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We estimate the following modification of the baseline Eq.(1.3.2):
cflowit = φt + αi + δcflowit−1 + β1FREF Supervit + β2FREF Competit+
+β3FREF Supervit +×FREF Competit + Γ′Xit + it
(1.6.1)
where FREF Compet equals 1 in the countries that underwent only the competition reforms,
FREF Superv equals 1 in the countries that underwent only the supervision reforms and
the interaction term between FREF Compet and FREF Superv, which equals 1 in the
countries that underwent both the reforms after the second reform was launched. Therefore
β1 captures the impact on capital flows in the countries that have undergone a competition
Table 1.8: Financial Reform and Capital Flows: Transparency and Competition
Total Capital Inflows Total Capital Outflows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FREF Compet. -0.00175 -0.00665 -0.00275 -0.00478
(.0072) (.00792) (.0031) (.00376)
FREF Superv. 0.0291∗∗∗ -0.00199 0.0253∗∗ 0.00444
(.0107) (.014) (.0101) (.0161)
FREF Compet. x FREF Superv. 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗
(.0109) (.0104)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741
Countries 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .64 .64 .72 .72
No. of instruments 61 62 61 62
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .0014 / .89 .0013 / .89 .016 / .4 .016 / .4
Hansen J p-value .66 .64 .11 .12
Wald p-value .023 .073
Dep. var: gross capital inflows/outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. Hansen J reports the p-value for
the null hypothesis of instrument validity. AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order auto-
-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. Joint sign. p-value is the p-value of the Wald
test for the joint significance of FREFcompet, FREFsuperv and FREFCompet.xFREFSuperv.
Standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
reform at time t in comparison to countries that did not undergo any competition reforms
until that time. Analagously, β2 describes the effect for the countries that have undergone
a supervision reform. Finally, β3 stands for the impact for the countries both strengthening
the supervision and improving the competition in the banking sector.
In Table 1.8 we report the estimates for the total capital inflows and outflows17. In Col.
17In Table 1.26 in the Appendix we report full estimation results.
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(1) and (3) we present the baseline difference-in-differences estimates, whereas in Col.(2)
and (4) we include also the interaction term. If considered alone, a reform in banking
competition has no significant impact neither on the gross inflows, not on the outflows.
In contrast, an improvement in the regulatory framework is found to have a positive effect,
symmetrical for the inflows and outflows (0.03pp increase for the inflows and 0.025pp increase
for the outflows). However, once we add the interaction term it enters the regressions with a
positive and significant sign, whereas the coefficient on banking supervision loses significance
(Col.(2) and (4)). This means that any positive effects that were attributed to banking
supervision reforms in the specifications without the interaction are in reality due to the
positive effects in countries whose banking sectors have experienced an improvement both
in the competition and in the regulatory framework18. Such a result suggests a very strong
complementarity between liberalization of different aspects of the financial sector: if countries
forgo competition reform or supervision reforms in isolation, the impact on capital flows is
negligible. The magnitude of the effect is comparable to the baseline estimates from section
1.4: a complex financial sector liberalization causes an increase of 0.04pp in the capital
inflows and an increase of 0.027pp in the capital outflows across the reforming countries as
compared to the control group. In Tables 1.9 and 1.10 we report the estimation results
Table 1.9: Financial Reform and Capital Inflows: Transparency and Competition, all com-
ponents
Direct Investment Debt Flows Portfolio Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FREF Compet. 0.00209 0.00182 -0.00413 -0.00821 0.0279∗ -0.00506
(.00206) (.00214) (.00619) (.00656) (.0169) (.00588)
FREF Superv. 0.00923∗∗ 0.00777 0.0153∗∗ -0.00461 0.00793∗ -0.00523
(.00423) (.00533) (.0069) (.0117) (.00469) (.00559)
FREF Compet. x FREF Superv. 0.00196 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗
(.00734) (.0145) (.0101)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741 1733 1733
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .40 .40 .59 .59 .43 .43
No. of instruments 61 62 61 62 61 62
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .0046 / .85 .0047 / .84 .0061 /.42 .0006 / .44 .026 / .29 .025 / .29
Hansen J p-value .35 .36 .4 .44 .21 .21
Wald p-value .037 .045 .086
Dep. var: gross capital inflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instruments
validity. AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. Wald
p-value is the p-value of the Wald test for the joint significance of FREFcompet, FREFsuperv and FREFCompet.xFREFSuperv.
Standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
18Note that this specification does not require that reforms are implemented at the same time, neither it
tells anything on the specific ordering of the reforms.
30 Financial Deregulation and Capital Flows
for the disaggregated inflows and outflows19. We find that only a complex liberalization
has a significant impact on debt and portfolio equity flows (Col.(4) and (6)), whereas the
interaction term is not significant for the direct investment flows. In all of the specifications
the coefficient on the banking supervision is positive and significant, yet it loses significance
upon controlling for the interaction. As far as the outflows are concerned, they exhibit a very
similar patterns to the inflows, yet with positive and significant coefficients of the interaction
term for all of the flow components.20
Table 1.10: Financial Reform and Capital Outflows: Transparency and Competition
Direct Investment Debt Flows Portfolio Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FREF Compet. 0.00390 -0.00131 -0.00182 -0.00392 0.000491 -0.00183
(.0768) (.000814) (.00206) (.0025) (.000925) (.0014)
FREF Superv. 0.0690∗∗∗ 0.00997 0.0132∗∗ 0.00313 0.00713∗∗ -0.00346
(.00247) (.0314) (.00617) (.0101) (.00308) (.00328)
FREF Compet. x FREF Superv. 0.0758∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗ 0.0138∗∗
(.00423) (.00624) (.00562)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741 1717 1717
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .53 .53 .69 .69 .49 .49
No. of instruments 61 62 61 62 61 62
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .0044 / .86 .0045 / .85 .019 / .94 .019 / .94 .039 / .34 .038 / .34
Hansen J p-value .73 .74 .16 .15 .77 .76
Wald p-value .04 .094 .033
Dep. var: gross capital outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instruments
validity. AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. Wald
p-value is the p-value of the Wald test for the joint significance of FREFcompet, FREFsuperv and FREFCompet.xFREFSuperv.
Standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1.7 Conclusion
The relationship between financial development and national financial positions has been fre-
quently addressed in the economic literature. Although there is a well-established theoretical
literature stressing a myriad of mechanisms through which financial sector advancements af-
fect the capital flows, the empirical literature lacks a relevant event-analysis of the impact
of the financial sector reforms on the variations in country’s flows of foreign liabilities and
assets. This paper presents the first attempt to assess the effect of a large-scale financial
sector deregulation reform on the capital flows. We analyze the impact of a permanent fi-
nancial liberalization in the banking industry on the gross capital inflows and outflows. In
19As before, full estimation results can be found in the Appendix Tables 1.27 and 1.28.
20Note that this is in line with the results from section 1.5.
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contrast to the previous literature, we depart from a cross-country setting and exploit the
within country variation of capital flows following the reform episodes. The results point
to increases of 0.035pp to 0.031pp in the average capital inflows and outflows following a
complex and permanent deregulation. However, we find that the dynamic impact of the
reform is uneven: on impact both capital inflows and outflows fall and the positive effects
arise only after 4 − 5 or more years after the liberalization. Further analysis reveals that
the initial fall is driven by the debt component of inflows and outflows, whereas the long
term increases are observed in all of the capital flow components: debt, portfolio equity
and direct investment. This short term dynamics can be fueled by the substitution effects
between domestic and foreign financing. Upon financial reform the access to credit increases
and some of the domestic residents who had been financing their activity abroad now turn
to domestic resources (decrease in debt inflow). A plausible explanation for the short term
increase in the outflows is the theory recently developed by Martin and Ventura (2015).
Suppose that the deregulating economy is characterized by a relatively symmetric pools of
low productivity firms and high productivity firms. The unproductive firms exit the market
and the freed financial resources are absorbed by high productivity firms. Since the newly
available funds are entirely absorbed by the demand of the surviving firms, the interest rate
increases and the debt outflows fall in response. However, this effect is temporary and once
the reform-induced reallocation takes place, the capital outflows begin to increase again as
observed in the regression results. In the long term, the financial reform improves the finan-
cial institutions. This, in turn, ameliorates the country’s attractiveness and credibility for
the foreign investors (increase in long-term inflows of portfolio equity and debt flows). On
the other hand, the development of national financial institutions facilitates their further in-
ternational presence and leads to the increases in all types of capital outflows (debt, portfolio
equity and direct investment). Additionally, the results point to a strong complementary
nature of the financial deregulation efforts. We find that the national financial system is
highly inter-connected and that an improvement in the banking competition alone did not
bring any impact for the capital flows unless it was accompanied by the strengthening in the
banking supervision, and vice versa.
One should bear in mind that an individual country experience of the financial deregulation
can deviate from the means, hence an extra caution should be applied for any policy recom-
mendations. We leave the theoretical explanation of the mechanisms behind the reported
dynamics of the capital flows after a financial deregulation for the future research agenda.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Tables and Figures
Table 1.11: Financial Liberalization Reversals
country year Fin.Liberalization Index (FLI) FLI value FLI value
component after the reversal before the reversal
Nigeria 2001 directed credit 2.0 3.0
Nigeria 2001 credit controls 2.25 3.00
Bolivia 2000 banking supervision 1.0 2.0
Figure 1.4: Average gross capital flows (to GDP) around the financial reform.
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Table 1.12: List of Identified Reform Episodes
No. Year Country
of deregulation
1 1987 Great Britain
2 1988 Denmark










13 1994 Hong Kong
14 1996 Peru












27 2000 South Africa







Table 1.13: Financial Reforms and Net Capital Inflows: Unconditional Results
OLS Year FE Difference in differences (Year FE + Country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM -0.00875 -0.000187 0.0193 0.0141 0.00489
(.0117) (.0125) (.0126) (.0107) (.00908)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years 0.00873 0.0104
(.0131) (.0132)
2 to 1 year 0.0236∗ 0.0248∗
(.0129) (.0146)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years 0.0207∗ 0.0275∗∗
(.0121) (.0135)
3 to 4 years 0.0323 0.0437
(.0287) (.0324)
5+ years 0.0168 0.0199
(.0154) (.0159)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No No No No
Lagged cflow No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2318 2318 2318 2227 2227 2227 2227
Countries 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
R2-adj. .00021 .014 .11 .13 .15 .13 .15
No. of instruments 55 58
AR-1/AR-2 p-values .019 / .96 .012 / .42
Hansen J p-value .68 .47
Dep. var: net (inflows-outflows) capital inflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in
capital flows. Col. (6)− (7) split the outcome of col. (4)− (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for
the null hypothesis of instrument validity. AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated distur-
-bances in the first differences equations. Standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.14: Financial Reforms and Net Capital Inflows
OLS Year FE Difference in differences (Year FE + Country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM -0.00240 0.00172 0.00134 -0.000563 0.0000819
(.0123) (.013) (.013) (.011) (.0103)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years 0.0111 0.00988
(.0103) (.00966)
2 to 1 year 0.0196∗ 0.0211∗∗
(.011) (.0105)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years 0.0126 0.0132
(.0122) (.0109)
3 to 4 years 0.0153 0.0157
(.0257) (.0225)
5+ years -0.000158 0.00368
(.0153) (.00715)
Trade Openness 0.00547 0.0117 0.0192 0.0156 0.00699 0.0139 0.00656
(.0177) (.0182) (.025) (.0228) (.0149) (.0231) (.0151)
Fin. Openness 0.00188 0.000717 0.00542 0.00508 0.00141 0.00473 0.000902
(.00275) (.00283) (.00484) (.00404) (.00278) (.00407) (.00269)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.00247 0.000981 -0.00326 -0.00185 0.000950 -0.00231 0.000701
(.00675) (.00677) (.00753) (.00531) (.00468) (.00528) (.00469)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.00972∗∗ -0.00938∗∗ -0.0153∗∗∗ -0.0129∗∗∗ -0.00934∗∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗ -0.00944∗∗∗
(.00448) (.00438) (.00547) (.00435) (.00347) (.00441) (.00344)
ICRG Composite -0.00861 -0.00648 -0.00661 -0.00533 -0.00475 -0.00494 -0.00460
(.00797) (.00743) (.00953) (.00791) (.00616) (.00784) (.00607)
Trade volume to gdp 0.0000566 0.0000647 0.000359∗ 0.000304∗ 0.0000554∗ 0.000332∗ 0.0000522
(.0000437) (.0000416) (.0002) (.000178) (.0000328) (.000174) (.0000323)
ln GDP p.c. 0.00344 -0.000118 0.106 0.0911∗ 0.000792 0.0908∗ 0.000483
(.00911) (.00866) (.0648) (.0532) (.0082) (.0529) (.00848)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1742 1742 1742 1741 1741 1741 1741
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .03 .045 .11 .14 .21 .14 .18
No. of instruments 60 64
AR-1 /AR-2 p-values .055/ .52 .055/ .53
Hansen J p-value .25 .24
Dep. var: gross capital inflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)− (7) split the
outcome of col. (4)− (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. AR-1/AR-2 are
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors clustered
at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.15: Financial Reform and Capital Inflows: Robustness 1, excl. UK and US
OLS Year FE Difference in differences (Year FE + Country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0820∗∗ 0.0142∗ 0.0280∗∗ 0.0298∗∗
(.04) (.0401) (.0125) (.0121) (.013)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years 0.00960 -0.00801
(.0124) (.00814)
2 to 1 year 0.0130 0.00821
(.017) (.0127)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years -0.0281∗∗ -0.0206∗∗
(.0121) (.00867)
3 to 4 years 0.00458 0.0138
(.0285) (.0263)
5+ years 0.0339∗ 0.0563∗∗∗
(.0174) (.00904)
Trade Openness 0.0313 0.0242 -0.0130 -0.00373 0.00982 0.00488 0.0147
(.0376) (.0377) (.0371) (.0235) (.0175) (.022) (.018)
Fin. Openness 0.00364 0.00248 0.0164∗∗ 0.00875∗∗ 0.00269 0.00940∗∗ 0.00519
(.00621) (.0061) (.00747) (.00411) (.00333) (.00395) (.00316)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.00400 -0.00729 -0.00367 -0.00161 -0.00322 -0.000275 -0.00279
(.00736) (.00786) (.00833) (.0044) (.00368) (.00425) (.0038)
Priv. credit to gdp 0.000922∗∗ 0.000897∗∗ 0.00183∗∗ 0.000970∗∗∗ 0.000486∗∗∗ 0.000892∗∗∗ 0.000570∗∗∗
(.000442) (.000409) (.000859) (.000315) (.000172) (.000325) (.000189)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.0211∗∗ -0.0185∗ -0.00909 -0.00341 -0.00743∗∗ -0.00324 -0.00691∗∗
(.0103) (.0101) (.00668) (.00416) (.00313) (.00402) (.00304)
ICRG Composite 0.0149∗ 0.0176∗∗ -0.00283 -0.00177 0.00691∗ -0.00250 0.00586
(.00818) (.00847) (.00885) (.00522) (.00386) (.00502) (.00395)
Trade volume to gdp 0.000295 0.000249 0.00161∗∗ 0.000859∗∗∗ 0.000146 0.000796∗∗ 0.000164
(.000216) (.000188) (.000749) (.000303) (.000105) (.000306) (.000104)
ln GDP p.c. 0.00745 0.0110 0.0960 0.0531 0.00766∗ 0.0570 0.0101∗∗
(.0077) (.00717) (.0794) (.0381) (.00428) (.0356) (.00457)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1623 1623 1623 1623 1623 1623 1623
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
R2-adj. .25 .34 .59 .69 .71 .69 .71
No. of instruments 61 65
AR-1/AR-2 p-values .0024 / .93 .0025 / .97
Hansen J p-value .28 .16
Dep. var: gross capital inflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)− (7) split the
outcome of col. (4)− (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. AR-1/AR-2 are
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors clustered
at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.16: Financial Reform and Capital Inflows: Robustness 2, excl. China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM 0.117∗∗∗ 0.0935∗∗ 0.0249∗∗ 0.0123∗ 0.0347∗∗∗
(.041) (.0415) (.0213) (.0107) (.00901)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years -0.0116 0.0132
(.0113) (.00826)
2 to 1 year 0.00909 0.00884
(.0163) (.0125)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years -0.0262∗∗ -0.0244∗∗∗
(.0113) (.00807)
3 to 4 years 0.00474 0.00769
(.0266) (.0237)
5+ years 0.0410∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗
(.017) (.00861)
Trade Openness -0.0124 -0.0145 -0.0179 -0.00961 -0.00832 -0.000370 -0.00816
(.0271) (.0278) (.0394) (.0234) (.0146) (.0216) (.0148)
Fin. Openness 0.0104∗∗ 0.00822∗ 0.0157∗∗ 0.00850∗∗ 0.00497∗ 0.00857∗∗ 0.00796∗∗∗
(.00485) (.00479) (.00765) (.00396) (.00274) (.004) (.00278)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.00357 -0.00710 -0.00978 -0.00417 -0.00315 -0.00240 -0.00302
(.00681) (.00753) (.00936) (.0043) (.00329) (.00412) (.00346)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.0218∗∗ -0.0190∗ -0.0118∗ -0.00474 -0.00752∗∗ -0.00469 -0.00694∗∗
(.00997) (.0099) (.00682) (.00398) (.00304) (.00382) (.00301)
ICRG Composite 0.0207∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.00221 0.000361 0.00982∗∗∗ -0.000367 0.00957∗∗∗
(.00835) (.0088) (.00888) (.00487) (.00351) (.00473) (.00371)
GDP growth 0.00348∗∗ 0.00152 -0.00154 -0.000530 0.000325 -0.000538 0.000299
(.00173) (.00177) (.00139) (.000874) (.00083) (.000853) (.00083)
Trade volume to gdp 0.000277 0.000241 0.00186∗∗ 0.000985∗∗∗ 0.000141 0.000908∗∗∗ 0.000160
(.000225) (.000197) (.000873) (.000327) (.000109) (.000326) (.000109)
ln GDP p.c. 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.150∗ 0.0796∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0808∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗
(.00649) (.00679) (.0869) (.0359) (.00444) (.0343) (.00508)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 83 83
R2-adj. .23 .32 .58 .68 .68
R2 .64
R3 .64
Observations 1718 1718 1718 1717 1717 1717 1717
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
R2-adj. .24 .32 .57 .68 .64 .68 .64
No. of instruments 61 65
AR-1/ AR-2 p-values .0013/ .98 .0014 / .97
Hansen J p-value .98 .83
Dep. var: gross capital inflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)− (7) split the
outcome of col. (4)− (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. AR-1/AR-2 are
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors clustered
at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.17: Financial Reform and Capital Inflows: Robustness 3, excl. UK, US and Switzer-
land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM 0.125∗∗∗ 0.0983∗∗ 0.0311∗ 0.0144∗ 0.0367∗∗∗
(.0416) (.0414) (.0187) (.0105) (.00901)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years -0.00843 -0.0103
(.0104) (.0078)
2 to 1 year 0.00188 0.00491
(.0161) (.0125)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years -0.0226∗ -0.0221∗∗∗
(.0114) (.00786)
3 to 4 years 0.00859 0.00987
(.024) (.0227)
5+ years 0.0479∗∗∗ 0.0511∗∗∗
(.017) (.00837)
Trade Openness -0.00820 -0.0275 -0.0106 -0.00870 -0.00982 0.00000746 -0.0116
(.0213) (.0234) (.0322) (.0194) (.0133) (.018) (.0134)
Fin. Openness 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗ 0.00844∗∗ 0.00683∗∗∗ 0.00828∗∗ 0.00998∗∗∗
(.00438) (.00423) (.00674) (.00355) (.00247) (.00362) (.00262)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) 0.00373 -0.00147 -0.00704 -0.00265 -0.00125 -0.00117 -0.00107
(.00535) (.00619) (.00822) (.00378) (.00295) (.00358) (.00308)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.0191∗∗ -0.0175∗ -0.00963∗ -0.00387 -0.00710∗∗ -0.00391 -0.00652∗∗
(.00926) (.00927) (.00549) (.00332) (.00285) (.00321) (.00284)
Freedom House -0.000871 -0.000653 -0.00673∗∗ -0.00362∗∗ -0.000612 -0.00298∗ -0.000167
(.00202) (.00199) (.00284) (.00167) (.00101) (.00161) (.00116)
GDP growth 0.00329∗∗ 0.00152 -0.00111 -0.000335 0.000413 -0.000382 0.000384
(.00156) (.0016) (.00111) (.000759) (.000736) (.000746) (.000742)
Trade volume to gdp 0.000265 0.000234 0.00139∗ 0.000703∗∗ 0.000142 0.000642∗ 0.000161
(.000214) (.000187) (.000723) (.000343) (.000103) (.000338) (.000104)
ln GDP p.c. 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.116∗ 0.0663∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗ 0.0661∗∗ 0.0237∗∗∗
(.00813) (.00842) (.0676) (.0292) (.00421) (.0277) (.00488)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1682 1682 1682 1681 1681 1681 1681
Countries 81 81 81 81 81 81 81
R2-adj. .23 .32 .57 .67 .64 .68 .64
No. of instruments 63 67
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .0011 /.89 .0012 / .84
Hansen J p-value .17 .15
Dep. var: gross capital inflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)− (7) split the
outcome of col. (4)− (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. AR-1/AR-2 are
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors clustered
at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.18: Financial Reform and Capital Inflows: Robustness 4, excl. Hong Kong and
Singapore
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM 0.116∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗ 0.0245∗ 0.0120∗ 0.0341∗∗∗
(.0422) (.0422) (.0209) (.0101) (.00912)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years -0.0118 -0.0130
(.0112) (.0081)
2 to 1 year 0.00909 0.00868
(.0161) (.0124)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years -0.0267∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗
(.0114) (.00808)
3 to 4 years 0.00367 0.00654
(.0267) (.0242)
5+ years 0.0408∗∗ 0.0781∗∗
(.0168) (.00853)
Trade Openness -0.0165 -0.0155 -0.0166 -0.00909 -0.00801 0.000176 -0.00770
(.0259) (.0265) (.0388) (.0229) (.014) (.0211) (.0142)
Fin. Openness 0.00987∗∗ 0.00789 0.0156∗∗ 0.00838∗∗ 0.00487∗ 0.00845∗∗ 0.00783∗∗∗
(.00492) (.00485) (.00751) (.00388) (.00277) (.00392) (.00281)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.00174 -0.00628 -0.0106 -0.00436 -0.00285 -0.00259 -0.00271
(.00681) (.00731) (.00966) (.00431) (.00321) (.00412) (.00338)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.0220∗∗ -0.0193∗∗ -0.0117∗ -0.00464 -0.00774∗∗∗ -0.00458 -0.00719∗∗
(.00973) (.00957) (.0067) (.00393) (.00296) (.00377) (.00294)
ICRG Composite 0.0225∗∗ 0.0257∗∗∗ 0.000777 -0.000195 0.0101∗∗∗ -0.000978 0.00978∗∗
(.00892) (.00943) (.00807) (.00457) (.00359) (.00444) (.00381)
Trade volume to gdp 0.000268 0.000227 0.00182∗∗ 0.000971∗∗∗ 0.000130 0.000902∗∗∗ 0.000148
(.000218) (.000192) (.00088) (.000332) (.000102) (.000332) (.000102)
ln GDP p.c. 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗ 0.149∗ 0.0785∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0796∗∗ 0.0186∗∗∗
(.00589) (.00637) (.086) (.0352) (.00459) (.0336) (.00517)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1716 1716 1716 1715 1715 1715 1715
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
R2-adj. .23 .32 .57 .67 .63 .68 .63
No. of instruments 63 67
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .0011 /.89 .0012 / .84
Hansen J p-value .17 .15
Dep. var: gross capital inflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)− (7) split the
outcome of col. (4)− (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. AR-1/AR-2 are
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors clustered
at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.19: Financial Reform and Capital Outflows: Robustness 1, excl. UK and US
OLS Year FE Difference in differences (Year FE + Country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM 0.111∗∗∗ 0.0871∗∗ 0.0172 0.0119∗∗ 0.0273∗∗∗
(.0413) (.0421) (.0185) (.00944) (.00805)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years -0.0138 0.0108
(.0108) (.0612)
2 to 1 year -0.0204 0.0162
(.0139) (.0973)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years -0.0234∗∗ -0.0140∗∗
(.0103) (.00679)
3 to 4 years -0.00186 0.00819
(.0199) (.0214)
5+ years 0.0337∗∗ 0.0958∗∗∗
(.0136) (.0069)
Trade Openness 0.0209 0.0120 -0.0492 -0.0280∗ -0.00532 -0.0207 -0.00157
(.035) (.0352) (.033) (.0161) (.0105) (.0145) (.0113)
Fin. Openness 0.00264 0.00211 0.0101 0.00436 0.000830 0.00521∗ 0.00308
(.00622) (.00604) (.00683) (.00296) (.00203) (.00293) (.00199)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.00942 -0.0138∗ -0.00913 -0.00322 -0.00391 -0.00206 -0.00363
(.00665) (.00719) (.00844) (.00364) (.00241) (.00335) (.0025)
Priv. credit to gdp 0.000974∗∗ 0.000951∗∗ 0.00152∗ 0.000641∗∗ 0.000346∗∗∗ 0.000562∗ 0.000406∗∗∗
(.000445) (.000418) (.00085) (.000286) (.000125) (.000293) (.000136)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.0155 -0.0133 -0.00132 0.00205 -0.00212 0.00232 -0.00161
(.0108) (.0106) (.00592) (.00288) (.00249) (.00269) (.00238)
ICRG Composite 0.0138∗ 0.0153∗ -0.00484 -0.00173 0.00436 -0.00259 0.00343
(.00808) (.00837) (.00747) (.00402) (.00319) (.0038) (.00312)
Trade volume to gdp 0.000229 0.000184 0.00127∗ 0.000551∗∗ 0.0000831 0.000490∗∗ 0.0000960
(.000238) (.000211) (.000697) (.000228) (.0000774) (.000224) (.000075)
ln GDP p.c. 0.0104 0.0150∗ 0.0783 0.0341 0.00722∗∗ 0.0382 0.00920∗∗∗
(.00855) (.00836) (.0735) (.0292) (.00328) (.0267) (.0033)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1623 1623 1623 1623 1623 1623 1623
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
R2-adj. .24 .31 .62 .75 .75 .75 .76
No. of instruments 61 65
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .02 / .46 .021 / .47
Hansen J p-value .12 .45
Dep. var: gross capital outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)− (7)
split the outcome of col. (4)− (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity.
AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.20: Financial Reform and Capital Outflows: Robustness 2, excl. China
OLS Year FE Difference in differences (Year FE + Country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM 0.122∗∗∗ 0.0982∗∗ 0.0265 0.0157∗ 0.0309∗∗∗
(.0428) (.0437) (.0194) (.00934) (.0108)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years -0.0137 -0.0132∗∗
(.00986) (.00671)
2 to 1 year -0.0178 -0.0174∗
(.0129) (.0097)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years -0.0220∗∗ -0.0169∗∗
(.00973) (.00668)
3 to 4 years -0.00161 0.00320
(.0177) (.0194)
5+ years 0.0408∗∗∗ 0.0523∗∗∗
(.0134) (.00594)
Trade Openness -0.0291 -0.0339 -0.0606∗ -0.0321∗∗ -0.0182∗∗ -0.0241∗ -0.0175∗
(.0267) (.0258) (.0327) (.0154) (.00883) (.0138) (.00931)
Fin. Openness 0.0106∗∗ 0.00912∗∗ 0.0107 0.00460 0.00282 0.00493∗ 0.00543∗∗∗
(.00478) (.00454) (.00692) (.00284) (.00172) (.00284) (.00181)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.00678 -0.0116∗ -0.0120 -0.00476 -0.00361 -0.00322 -0.00352
(.00621) (.00679) (.0088) (.00359) (.00231) (.00328) (.00247)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.0165 -0.0140 -0.00302 0.00137 -0.00225 0.00154 -0.00166
(.0105) (.0105) (.00596) (.00271) (.00239) (.00248) (.0023)
ICRG Composite 0.0200∗∗ 0.0230∗∗ 0.000327 0.000243 0.00673∗∗ -0.000656 0.00646∗∗
(.00847) (.00883) (.00775) (.00388) (.00308) (.00369) (.0031)
GDP growth 0.00280 0.000853 -0.00123 -0.000576 -0.0000198 -0.000558 -0.0000424
(.00174) (.00182) (.00108) (.000532) (.000493) (.000505) (.000478)
Trade volume to gdp 0.000214 0.000177 0.00150∗ 0.000647∗∗ 0.0000804 0.000574∗∗ 0.0000950
(.00025) (.000223) (.000824) (.000257) (.0000808) (.000249) (.0000791)
ln GDP p.c. 0.0257∗∗∗ 0.0279∗∗∗ 0.112 0.0481∗ 0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0497∗ 0.0149∗∗∗
(.00688) (.00722) (.0797) (.0276) (.00304) (.0263) (.00359)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1718 1718 1718 1717 1717 1717 1717
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
R2-adj. .23 .3 .61 .75 .72 .75 .72
No. of instruments 61 65
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .016 / .39 .016 /.39
Hansen J p-value .23 .17
Dep. var: gross capital outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)− (7)
split the outcome of col. (4)− (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity.
AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.21: Financial Reform and Capital Outflows: Robustness 3, excl. UK, US and
Switzerland
OLS Year FE Difference in differences (Year FE + Country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM 0.127∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.0297∗ 0.0160∗ 0.0307∗∗∗
(.0437) (.0439) (.0169) (.00815) (.0102)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years -0.00939 -0.00961
(.00901) (.00595)
2 to 1 year -0.0128 -0.0149
(.0125) (.00922)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years -0.0182∗ -0.0144∗∗
(.00949) (.00613)
3 to 4 years 0.00213 0.00551
(.0156) (.0182)
5+ years 0.0434∗∗∗ 0.0685∗∗∗
(.0138) (.00547)
Trade Openness -0.0122 -0.0347∗ -0.0536∗∗ -0.0300∗∗ -0.0157∗∗ -0.0233∗ -0.0168∗∗
(.0201) (.0192) (.026) (.0131) (.0075) (.0119) (.00795)
Fin. Openness 0.0112∗∗ 0.0128∗∗∗ 0.0105∗ 0.00467∗ 0.00393∗∗∗ 0.00478∗ 0.00650∗∗∗
(.00434) (.004) (.00616) (.00258) (.00148) (.0026) (.00174)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.000865 -0.00730 -0.00928 -0.00383 -0.00268 -0.00267 -0.00259
(.00451) (.00521) (.00761) (.00312) (.00193) (.00282) (.00205)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.0141 -0.0128 -0.00213 0.00167 -0.00197 0.00172 -0.00146
(.00976) (.00982) (.0049) (.0023) (.00223) (.00217) (.00216)
Freedom House -0.00260 -0.00233 -0.00694∗∗∗ -0.00327∗∗ -0.00114 -0.00266∗∗ -0.000733
(.00254) (.00248) (.00253) (.00127) (.000789) (.00114) (.000852)
GDP growth 0.00254 0.000715 -0.000785 -0.000393 0.00000863 -0.000413 -0.00000828
(.00157) (.00164) (.000759) (.000416) (.000439) (.000398) (.00043)
Trade volume to gdp 0.000199 0.000166 0.00111∗ 0.000482∗∗ 0.0000767 0.000424∗ 0.0000907
(.000235) (.000208) (.000655) (.000234) (.0000745) (.000227) (.0000735)
ln GDP p.c. 0.0375∗∗∗ 0.0424∗∗∗ 0.0861 0.0400∗ 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.0400∗ 0.0186∗∗∗
(.00912) (.00928) (.0627) (.0234) (.00318) (.0224) (.00369)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1682 1682 1682 1681 1681 1681 1681
Countries 81 81 81 81 81 81 81
R2-adj. .23 .29 .61 .75 .73 .75 .73
No. of instruments 63 67
AR-1 /AR-2 p-values .015 / .4 .016 / .4
Hansen J p-value .55 .30
Dep. var: gross capital outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)− (7)
split the outcome of col. (4)− (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity.
AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.22: Financial Reform and Capital Outflows: Robustness 4, excl. Hong Kong and
Singapore
OLS Year FE Difference in differences (Year FE + Country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FREFORM 0.118∗∗∗ 0.0943∗∗ 0.0263∗∗ 0.0150∗ 0.0295∗∗∗
(.044) (.0443) (.0091) (.009) (.0104)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years -0.0136 0.0132
(.00983) (.0639)
2 to 1 year -0.0175 0.0174
(.0127) (.0959)
0 to 2 years -0.0212∗∗ -0.0174∗∗∗
(.00995) (.00643)
3 to 4 years -0.00620 -0.00351
(.0172) (.0194)
5+ years 0.0410∗∗∗ 0.0504∗∗∗
(.0132) (.0185)
Trade Openness -0.0289 -0.0310 -0.0596∗ -0.0312∗∗ -0.0166∗∗ -0.0233∗ -0.0159∗
(.0246) (.0234) (.0319) (.0151) (.00833) (.0133) (.00889)
Fin. Openness 0.00974∗∗ 0.00857∗ 0.0106 0.00442 0.00267 0.00479∗ 0.00529∗∗∗
(.00474) (.0045) (.0068) (.00275) (.00173) (.00274) (.0018)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.00468 -0.0105 -0.0126 -0.00493 -0.00329 -0.00339 -0.00318
(.00596) (.00645) (.00909) (.0036) (.00214) (.00326) (.00233)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.0176∗ -0.0153 -0.00294 0.00149 -0.00263 0.00169 -0.00207
(.0102) (.0101) (.00585) (.00262) (.00224) (.00239) (.00216)
ICRG Composite 0.0215∗∗ 0.0232∗∗ -0.000660 -0.000555 0.00640∗∗ -0.00145 0.00610∗
(.00903) (.00944) (.00695) (.0035) (.00308) (.00332) (.00312)
Trade volume to gdp 0.000168 0.000126 0.00145∗ 0.000660∗∗ 0.0000601 0.000591∗∗ 0.0000747
(.00021) (.000185) (.000829) (.000264) (.0000652) (.000257) (.0000637)
ln GDP p.c. 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0263∗∗∗ 0.112 0.0464∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0480∗ 0.0145∗∗∗
(.00607) (.00659) (.0788) (.0266) (.00323) (.0252) (.00371)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1716 1716 1716 1715 1715 1715 1715
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
R2-adj. .23 .29 .61 .75 .73 .75 .73
No. of instruments 63 67
AR-1 /AR-2 p-values .015 / .4 .016 / .4
Hansen J p-value .55 .30
Dep. var: gross capital outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (6)− (7)
split the outcome of col. (4)− (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity.
AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.23: Financial Reform and Capital Inflows: components, full results
Direct Investment Debt Flows Portfolio Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FREFORM 0.00674 0.0199∗∗ 0.0120∗∗
(.00454) (.00845) (.00559)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years 0.00266 0.0106 0.0487
(.00213) (.01606) (.0231)
2 to 1 year 0.00929 -0.0203∗∗∗ 0.0300
(.00946) (.0075) (.0469)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years 0.000394 -0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0260
(.00346) (.00486) (.0448)
3 to 4 years 0.0140 -0.0150 0.0113
(.0131) (.0129) (.0829)
5+ years 0.00133 0.0535∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗
(.00192) (.00604) (.00758)
Trade Openness 0.00244 0.00188 -0.00478 -0.00455 -0.00618 -0.00586
(.0062) (.00614) (.00943) (.00974) (.00393) (.00412)
Fin. Openness 0.00159 0.00190∗ 0.00283 0.00513∗∗∗ 0.000733 0.00147∗
(.0011) (.00113) (.00192) (.00196) (.000791) (.000879)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.000111 -0.000258 -0.00229 -0.00216 0.000101 0.000123
(.0013) (.00135) (.00183) (.00194) (.0013) (.00132)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.00132 -0.00133 -0.00576∗∗∗ -0.00541∗∗∗ -0.00110 -0.000921
(.00125) (.00127) (.00199) (.00197) (.00147) (.0014)
ICRG Composite 0.00403∗∗∗ 0.00403∗∗∗ 0.00581∗∗ 0.00556∗∗ 0.00176 0.00182
(.00127) (.00128) (.00271) (.00284) (.0017) (.00174)
Trade volume to gdp 0.0000797∗∗ 0.0000811∗∗ 0.0000703 0.0000860 0.0000260 0.0000307
(.0000327) (.000033) (.0000559) (.0000574) (.0000407) (.0000411)
ln GDP p.c. -0.00210 -0.00158 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.00418∗∗∗ 0.00542∗∗∗
(.00163) (.00159) (.00385) (.00409) (.00122) (.00142)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741 1733 1733
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .4 .4 .59 .59 .43 .43
No. of instruments 60 64 60 64 60 64
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .00051/ .69 .00051 / .87 .00048 / .43 .00059 / .28 .023 / .29 .023 /.44
Hansen J p-value .30 .15 .31 .25 .56 .23
Dep. var: gross capital outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (2), (4), (6)
split the outcome of col. (1), (3), (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity.
AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.24: Financial Reform and Capital Outflows: components, full results
Direct Investment Debt Flows Portfolio Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FREFORM 0.0831∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗
(.00255) (.00739) (.00378)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years 0.00305 0.00876 0.00405
(.0147) (.0425) (.0197)
2 to 1 year 0.00350 0.0160 -0.0218
(.0191) (.0685) (.0285)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years 0.0495 -0.0117∗∗ 0.0490
(.0446) (.00504) (.0349)
3 to 4 years 0.0236 -0.00925 0.0476
(.0823) (.0148) (.0597)
5+ years 0.04157∗∗∗ 0.0491∗∗ 0.0407∗∗
(.0017) (.00353) (.00123)
Trade Openness -0.00201 -0.00190 -0.00667 -0.00648 -0.00414 -0.00357
(.00316) (.00331) (.00594) (.00606) (.00287) (.00292)
Fin. Openness 0.000939∗∗ 0.00166∗∗∗ 0.00209 0.00372∗∗ 0.00125∗∗ 0.00213∗∗∗
(.000453) (.00064) (.00134) (.00145) (.000611) (.000629)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.000303 -0.000297 -0.00363∗∗∗ -0.00354∗∗ -0.00145∗ -0.00142
(.000469) (.000535) (.00138) (.00147) (.000825) (.000881)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.000790 -0.000640 -0.00210 -0.00178 -0.000140 0.0000212
(.000546) (.00055) (.00131) (.00125) (.000983) (.000928)
ICRG Composite 0.000573 0.000558 0.00529∗∗ 0.00508∗∗ 0.00141 0.00140
(.000802) (.000807) (.00214) (.00218) (.00101) (.00108)
Trade volume to gdp 0.0000181 0.0000224∗ 0.0000367 0.0000468 0.0000247 0.0000299
(.0000129) (.0000136) (.0000434) (.0000437) (.0000292) (.0000293)
ln GDP p.c. 0.00308∗ 0.00391∗ 0.00597∗∗ 0.00789∗∗∗ 0.00383∗∗∗ 0.00507∗∗∗
(.00173) (.0021) (.00251) (.00268) (.000955) (.00123)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741 1717 1717
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .53 .53 .69 .69 .5 .49
No. of instruments 60 64 60 64 60 64
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .0029 / .89 .0032 / .87 .022 / .95 .023 / .94 .041 / .38 .041 / .38
Hansen J p-value .47 .62 .13 .28 .17 .19
Dep. var: gross capital outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (2), (4), (6)
split the outcome of col. (1), (3), (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity.
AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.25: Financial Reform and Net Capital Inflows: FDI, debt and equity flows
Direct Investment Debt Flows Portfolio Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FREFORM -0.00760∗ 0.00169 0.000770
(.00423) (.0098) (.00588)
Before Financial Liberalization:
5 to 3 years 0.00688∗ 0.00701 -0.00166
(.00356) (.00873) (.00331)
2 to 1 year 0.0162∗∗ 0.00684 0.00382
(.00647) (.00989) (.00632)
After Financial Liberalization:
0 to 2 years 0.00679 0.00311 0.00192
(.00528) (.00986) (.00477)
3 to 4 years 0.0112 -0.00384 0.00850
(.0124) (.0163) (.011)
5+ years -0.00412 0.00493 0.000313
(.00355) (.0073) (.00202)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741 1733 1733
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .2 .2 .14 .14 .12 .12
No. of instruments 60 64 60 64 60 64
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .0075 / .68 .0068 / .67 .089 / .1 .089 /.1 .021 / .32 .021 / .35
Hansen J p-value .17 .19 .9 .89 .84 .58
Dep. var: net capital inflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. All regressions include regional trends in capital flows. Col. (2), (4), (6)
split the outcome of col. (1), (3), (5) (resp.) into time effects. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity.
AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.26: Financial Reform and Capital Flows: Transparency and Competition
Total Capital Inflows Total Capital Outflows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FREF Compet. -0.00175 -0.00665 -0.00275 -0.00478
(.0072) (.00792) (.0031) (.00376)
FREF Superv. 0.0291∗∗∗ -0.00199 0.0253∗∗ 0.00444
(.0107) (.014) (.0101) (.0161)
FREF Compet. x FREF Superv. 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗
(.0109) (.0104)
Trade Openness 0.00143 0.00162 -0.0209∗∗ -0.0207∗∗
(.0163) (.0162) (.00962) (.00941)
Fin. Openness 0.00485∗ 0.00457∗ 0.00409∗∗ 0.00393∗∗
(.0027) (.00268) (.00167) (.00163)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.00420 -0.00378 -0.00310 -0.00282
(.00323) (.00315) (.00234) (.00223)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.00749∗∗ -0.00740∗∗ -0.00156 -0.00153
(.00318) (.00316) (.00282) (.0028)
ICRG Composite 0.00999∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.00675∗∗ 0.00707∗∗
(.00343) (.00354) (.00284) (.00297)
Trade volume to gdp 0.000123 0.000119 0.0000745 0.0000724
(.0000982) (.0000991) (.0000769) (.0000777)
ln GDP p.c. 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗
(.00434) (.00431) (.00288) (.00287)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741
Countries 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .64 .64 .72 .72
No. of instruments 61 62 61 62
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .0014 / .89 .0013 / .89 .016 / .4 .016 / .4
Hansen J p-value .66 .64 .11 .12
Wald p-value .023 .073
Dep. var: gross capital inflows/outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. Hansen J reports the p-value for
the null hypothesis of instrument validity. AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order auto-
-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. Joint sign. p-value is the p-value of the Wald
test for the joint significance of FREFcompet, FREFsuperv and FREFCompet.xFREFSuperv.
Standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.27: Financial Reform and Capital Inflows: Transparency and Competition, all com-
ponents
Direct Investment Debt Flows Portfolio Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FREF Compet. 0.00209 0.00182 -0.00413 -0.00821 0.0279∗ -0.00506
(.00206) (.00214) (.00619) (.00656) (.0169) (.00588)
FREF Superv. 0.00923∗∗ 0.00777 0.0153∗∗ -0.00461 0.00793∗ -0.00523
(.00423) (.00533) (.0069) (.0117) (.00469) (.00559)
FREF Compet. x FREF Superv. 0.00196 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗
(.00734) (.0145) (.0101)
Trade Openness 0.00811 0.00810 0.000335 0.000423 -0.00540 -0.00518
(.00921) (.00923) (.0088) (.00881) (.00443) (.00425)
Fin. Openness 0.000191 0.000174 0.00350∗∗ 0.00332∗ 0.000885 0.000772
(.00124) (.00123) (.00174) (.0017) (.000887) (.000906)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.00104 -0.00102 -0.00302∗ -0.00276∗ 0.000301 0.000491
(.00147) (.00145) (.00166) (.00161) (.00135) (.00129)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.00189 -0.00188 -0.00477∗∗ -0.00471∗∗ -0.00164 -0.00162
(.00123) (.00122) (.00211) (.0021) (.00162) (.00162)
ICRG Composite 0.00461∗∗∗ 0.00463∗∗∗ 0.00595∗∗ 0.00621∗∗ 0.00102 0.00121
(.00131) (.00132) (.00285) (.0029) (.00147) (.00156)
Trade volume to gdp 0.0000729∗∗ 0.0000726∗∗ 0.0000620 0.0000595 0.0000182 0.0000166
(.0000306) (.0000306) (.0000498) (.0000504) (.0000353) (.0000356)
ln GDP p.c. -0.00257 -0.00258 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.00387∗∗∗ 0.00383∗∗∗
(.00162) (.00163) (.00371) (.00371) (.00125) (.00123)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741 1733 1733
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .40 .40 .59 .59 .43 .43
No. of instruments 61 62 61 62 61 62
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .0046 / .85 .0047 / .84 .0061 /.42 .0006 / .44 .026 / .29 .025 / .29
Hansen J p-value .35 .36 .4 .44 .21 .21
Wald p-value .037 .045 .086
Dep. var: gross capital inflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instruments
validity. AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. Wald
p-value is the p-value of the Wald test for the joint significance of FREFcompet, FREFsuperv and FREFCompet.xFREFSuperv.
Standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.28: Financial Reform and Capital Outflows: Transparency and Competition
Direct Investment Debt Flows Portfolio Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FREF Compet. 0.00390 -0.00131 -0.00182 -0.00392 0.000491 -0.00183
(.0768) (.000814) (.00206) (.0025) (.000925) (.0014)
FREF Superv. 0.0690∗∗∗ 0.00997 0.0132∗∗ 0.00313 0.00713∗∗ -0.00346
(.00247) (.0314) (.00617) (.0101) (.00308) (.00328)
FREF Compet. x FREF Superv. 0.0758∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗ 0.0138∗∗
(.00423) (.00624) (.00562)
Trade Openness -0.00245 -0.00235 -0.00811 -0.00803 -0.00260 -0.00254
(.00252) (.00247) (.00569) (.00565) (.00298) (.00293)
Fin. Openness 0.000864∗ 0.000829∗ 0.00268∗∗ 0.00259∗∗ 0.00143∗∗∗ 0.00135∗∗∗
(.000477) (.000474) (.00127) (.00125) (.00055) (.000524)
Cap. Ctrls (IMF) -0.000337 -0.000242 -0.00343∗∗ -0.00330∗∗ -0.00155∗ -0.00140∗
(.000497) (.000474) (.00148) (.00145) (.000899) (.00084)
Ex. Rate Regime -0.000730 -0.000721 -0.00114 -0.00111 -0.000510 -0.000475
(.000546) (.000545) (.00148) (.00148) (.0011) (.00109)
ICRG Composite 0.000902 0.001000 0.00540∗∗∗ 0.00554∗∗∗ 0.00191 0.00206∗
(.000941) (.000955) (.00191) (.00197) (.00118) (.00123)
Trade volume to gdp 0.0000159 0.0000154 0.0000322 0.0000310 0.0000237 0.0000227
(.000012) (.0000122) (.0000387) (.0000389) (.000029) (.0000293)
ln GDP p.c. 0.00300∗ 0.00301∗ 0.00494∗∗ 0.00491∗∗ 0.00379∗∗∗ 0.00379∗∗∗
(.00154) (.00154) (.00207) (.00207) (.00101) (.001)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged cflow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741 1717 1717
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84
R2-adj. .53 .53 .69 .69 .49 .49
No. of instruments 61 62 61 62 61 62
AR-1 / AR-2 p-values .0044 / .86 .0045 / .85 .019 / .94 .019 / .94 .039 / .34 .038 / .34
Hansen J p-value .73 .74 .16 .15 .77 .76
Wald p-value .04 .094 .033
Dep. var: gross capital outflows to GDP in constant 2005 USD. Hansen J reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instruments
validity. AR-1/AR-2 are the p-values for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. Wald
p-value is the p-value of the Wald test for the joint significance of FREFcompet, FREFsuperv and FREFCompet.xFREFSuperv.
Standard errors clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 2
There and Back Again?
Heterogeneous Firms, Product
Quality and Reshoring Decision1
Abstract
We develop a novel theory to explain the recent phenomenon of reshoring, i.e. firms moving
back their previously offshored business activities. Thanks to the access to a unique survey
of American reshoring firms, we provide evidence for the importance of quality behind the
reshoring decision. Building on Antoniades (2015) we develop a dynamic heterogeneous
firms model in which firms decide where to locate production and choose the quality of
the produced variety. In the dynamic setting quality choice plays an important role as the
production location decision entails a tradeoff between payroll and quality-related costs. In
equilibrium reshoring decision arises as some firms initially offshore, exploit the rise in the
profits due wages differentials and finally return to domestic country to further increase the
quality. Moreover, the model delivers equilibrium sorting of firms: the most productive
firms will never offshore, the least productive firms will always offshore and the firms with
an intermediate productivity decide to reshore.2
Keywords: Heterogeneous Firms, Quality Choice, Offshoring, Reshoring
JEL Classification: F12, O14, R3
1This chapter is a joint work with Barbara Bratta.
2We would like to thank to Matteo Cervellati, David Collie, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Alireza Naghavi,
Paolo Manasse and the participants of internal seminars at University of Bologna, Cardiff University and
ETSG 2017 Conference in Florence for constructive comments.
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2.1 Introduction and literature review
The reshoring of the manufacturing production has recently gained a lot of publicity in the
advanced economies. Although the aggregate offshoring trends do not seem to be yet re-
verted3, the increasing number of firms choosing to transfer back the manufacturing activities
to their home countries caught the attention of both media and the experts. Especially in the
United States the public debate on the topic is very lively as the most prominent examples
of reshorers include General Electric transferring the production of the water heaters from
China to Louisville, Kentucky4, Ford Motor Company shifting its production of the newest
EcoBoost engines from China to Cleveland5 or General Motors moving the production of the
next-generation Cadillac SRX from Mexico to Spring Hill, Tennessee6. In his 2013 State of
the Union speech president Obama stated: So we have a huge opportunity, at this moment,
to bring manufacturing back. But we have to seize it.7.
Despite such a broad public debate the academic discussion of the topic is scarce. Empirical
investigation is suffering from the lack of a representative economy-wide data and relies on
the surveys conducted within reshoring companies. Kinkel (2014) and Kinkel and Maloca
(2009) report the survey data for German firms, Dachs and Zanker (2014) report reshoring
surveys for eight European countries, Bailey and Propris (2014) and Pricewaterhouse Coop-
ers (2014) report on the reshoring trends in UK. The trends in US reshoring over recent
years are thoroughly covered by various consultancy companies reports: The Boston Con-
sulting Group (2011, 2013, 2014) and The Hackett Group (2012) with mixed conclusions on
the prospects of reshoring. Attempts to measure the importance of reshoring on aggregate
economy level are limited. Oldenski (2015) reports that in the period 1999 − 2012 imports
by US-based multinational (MNE) affiliates were steadily increasing. DeBacker et al. (2016)
study MNEs activity for a number of advanced countries and check whether there were are
any changes in the share of the productive resources deployed in the home countries of those
companies. In the sample of US MNEs they find no evidence of any increase in the home
share in employment, however they provide some evidence of a growing concentration of
capital investments; they document this pattern also for some other high-income economies.
In spite of the obvious issue of the representativeness, the survey studies provide some in-
teresting insights into the drivers of reshoring decision. Kinkel (2014) report that 65% of
reshorers in Germany in the period 2010−2012 quoted quality-related problems as the main
reason behind production transfer. Similarly, EEF The Manufacturer’s Organization/GFK
3Oldenski (2015)
4National Public Radio, As Overseas Costs Rise, More US Companies Are Reshoring, January 27, 2014.
5Alisa Priddle, Ford Starts Building Newest Engines in Cleveland, Detroit Free Press, March 7, 2015
6Associated Press, GM Moving Cadillac SRX Production from Mexico to TN, August 27, 2014
7See State of the Union 2013 and also Economist article
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(2014) reports that the main motivation of the UK reshorers surveyed in 2014 was an in-
tention to improve quality, mentioned by 49% of the interviewed companies. Thanks to the
access to a unique survey of American reshoring firms in the period 1995− 2015, we provide
a preliminary evidence for the importance of quality and technology upgrade as the main
drivers behind the reshoring decision also for US-based companies. It turns out that also
within the group of US reshorers the quality-related problems are the main negative (push)
factor behind giving up on the offshoring activity. Additionally, over 27% of those firms
quote innovation possibilities and skilled workforce access as the main positive (pull) factors
for locating the production back in the US. Moreover, another 12% of the firms quote access
to skilled workforce as an important reshoring driver. In this paper we embrace this quality-
related evidence and we develop a novel theory that explains the recent growing reshoring
activity.
To our best knowledge there is only one theoretical paper that generates reshoring patterns.
Baldwin and Venables (2013) analyze theoretically the location decision of a global firm, sepa-
rating between a sequential (snake) and a more separated (spider) production processes. The
location decision in their model is the outcome of the proximity-concentration tradeoff, i.e.
the tradeoff between the international differences in the production costs and the production
co-location benefits. The reductions in international frictions (trade costs, communication
or coordination costs) facilitate the relocation of production but can result in overshooting
of offshoring and a subsequent reshoring pattern. Recent working paper by Tyazhelnikov
(2016), a generalization of Baldwin and Venables (2013) also delivers a reshoring pattern in
equilibrium. Similarly to Baldwin and Venables (2013) line of reasoning, for the high values
of trade costs firms chose to produce the whole good in the first country, but given a decrease
in trade costs, they choose to offshore a large cluster. When trade costs decrease even fur-
ther, firms further fragment their production and reshore a part of the previously offshored
cluster. However, none of those papers considers the innovation prospects or quality choice
in the production process. Therefore, our approach to reshoring is complementary, as we put
the quality-related factors at the heart of our analysis. Moreover, we conduct the analysis in
a heterogeneous firm framework, a margin which is absent in Baldwin and Venables (2013)
(yet present in Tyazhelnikov (2016)).
This paper also contributes to the literature by developing a theory for the offshoring and
the quality choice in the heterogeneous firm framework. To our best knowledge, Smeets et al.
(2014) is the only one paper that studies this question. However, the model developed there
is static and therefore it does not admit a reshoring possibility, which is in turn the core of
our analysis.
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In our setting each firm produces a single good for the domestic country market8, deciding
the quantity and the quality supplied as well as the factory location. We build on Antoni-
ades (2015), a model introducing the quality choice into seminal Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
framework and we enrich it in two steps. First, we add the offshoring possibility. Offshoring
is reducing the wage costs paid by the firms, but it is increasing the quality production costs
and entails a transportation cost for the components (of an iceberg type). The introduction
of the offshoring possibility into Antoniades (2015) leads to the following findings: i) the
most productive firms produce only domestically, ii) the least productive firms offshore, iii)
thanks to the offshoring possibility some of the least productive firms, who would have to
otherwise exit the market, produce. Second, we extend the enriched model into a dynamic,
two-period setting. The high quality varieties yield higher revenues than the low quality
ones, yet quality production is costly. Firms would be therefore facing a choice between set-
ting a high quality upfront or smoothing the quality upgrade across both periods. Since the
fixed costs of quality innovation are convex, firms will find it optimal to set a given level of
quality in the first period and upgrade it in the second period. Once we allow for offshoring,
some firms in the first period produce abroad. Yet given the second period quality upgrade
and increasing quality adaptation costs it entails, they transfer the production back to the
domestic country.
We solve the model numerically. The equilibrium delivers a sorting pattern: the most pro-
ductive firms always produce domestically, the least productive always offshore and the firms
with an intermediate productivity reshore. We discuss the crucial parameters affecting the
equilibrium interval of the productivity for which reshoring arises. Comparative statics exer-
cises points the importance of the love for quality parameter. The increase in the consumers’
taste for quality increases the intensity of the reshoring activity in equilibrium.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2.2 we present stylized facts
about the US reshoring firms. In section 2.3 we develop the static model, section 2.4 in-
troduces the dynamic model and describes the solution method as well as the equilibrium
outcomes and comparative statics. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The US Reshorers: a brief view
Reshoring Initiative (RI)9 is a non-profit organization assisting US companies in the reshoring
process. One of the core assets of RI is its reshoring database, in which the organization
collects the data on the events of reshoring among the US companies from the publicly avail-
8We assume that the domestic and offshore countries are the advanced and developing economies, respec-
tively.
9www.reshorenow.org
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able sources (press releases, companies white papers, media announcements, etc.) as well
as directly from the firms, and verifies their accuracy. In June 2015 RI kindly shared this
database with us. Its full content covered 410 reshoring firms and another 231 classified as
kept from offshoring. Each record comprises the company name, the year of reshoring, the
product reshored, industry classification and the main domestic and offshore factors behind
the transfer decision.
Table 2.2 in the Appendix summarizes the timing of the observed reshoring events. Although
there were occasional events of reshoring dating back to as early as 1995, the majority of
the reshoring decisions were taken in post-2010, with a clear concentration in the period
2012− 2014.10. Figure 2.8 in the Appendix represents the sectoral composition of reshored
companies: it is clearly dominated by manufacturing industry, which coupled with retail and






Quality Issues 31,63 Technology and innovation difficulties 27,74
Freight costs 29,20 Other 20,19
Lead time, inventory 27,49 Skilled workforce 12,41
Wage costs 19,22 Government Incentives 9,00
Communication & audit 10,46 U.S. price of natural gas 4,38
Intellectual property 6,33 Customer/demand issues 4,38
Loss of control 5,35 Eco-system synergies 3,89
Other 4,87 Infrastructure 2,92
Ethical/green considerations 4,14 Lower real-estate/construction costs 0,97






Table 2.1: Main offshore and domestic factors behind reshoring decision for US firms
Probably the most important aspect of RI data are survey questions in which the reshoring
firms quote the main drivers of reshoring, describing both the offshore push factors and the
pull home country incentives. Table 2.1 summarizes this information11. Although some of
the firms point to more than one factor (with the single top-scorer quoting 11 factors), the
10Observation in year 2016 refers to the firms that declared reshoring scheduled to take place in 2016.
11Note that in Table 2.1 the percentage do not sum up to 100 as each firm can quote one or more factors.
The percentage is expressed in reference to the total number of factors quoted.
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mode for the number of pull and push factors is 1. Similarly to the survey-based reshoring
evidence in Germany and the UK, the quality-related problems faced by offshore plants
seem to be the leading factor behind a production transfer also for the American firms.
The quality-related factors comprise problems with necessary rework, warranty issues, low
product liability and alike. Overall, above 31% of the firms report quality problems followed
by lead time and inventory and freight costs (29% and 27%, resp.). Increasing wage costs
are quoted by 19% of firms. The prominent role of the quality considerations is even more
evident once we limit the analysis to the group of firms who quote only one main driver
behind their reshoring decision (Figure 2.1): over 40% of the firms point to the quality
issues with lead time and inventory costs being second factor, mentioned in less than 20% of
the answers; wage costs are mentioned by less than 10% of the firms. Complimentary to the
quality issues domination in the negative offshore factors, approximately a third of the firms
interviewed point also to the limited scope for the product innovation as the main positive
domestic reason for reshoring (Table 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Offshore factors behind reshoring in the sample of firms quoting one reason only
2.3 Static Model
Prior to developing a full dynamic model, we begin with a simple static framework in which
we can highlight the relationships between the quality choice and offshoring. We base our
setting on the closed economy version of Antoniades (2015) which we alter by adding the
production location choice.
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Preferences The economy is populated with L consumers, each supplying one unit of
labor. The utility expression follows closely Antoniades (2015) and reads:























where qcω and q
c
o represent the consumption of the numeraire good and the variety ω, and
zω stands for the quality of a variety ω. α and η capture the degree of substitution between
each variety and the numeraire, γ describes the degree of differentiation among the varieties.
Importantly, β is a taste for quality parameter. The inverse demand for each variety is:
pω = α− γqcω + βzω − ηQc (2.3.2)
Technology As in Antoniades (2015) a firm produces a given variety ω with an inelasti-
cally supplied labor input. Homogeneous good and labor markets are competitive. Upon
payment of the entry cost fe, a firm draws productivity which determines its marginal cost
c (distributed accordingly to G(c) on the support [0, cM ]). The firms that can cover their
marginal cost survive and produce, those with the lowest productivity exit the market. The
survivors maximize the profits based on the residual demand curve, taking the average prices,
the average quality level and the number of firms, N , as given. We allow the firms to choose
their production location: they decide whether to remain and produce at home or whether
to offshore. For simplicity, we assume the extreme view of offshoring: once deciding to off-
shore, a firm will offshore all of its production.12 We formulate the total cost structures by
closely following Antoniades (2015), but we introduce a difference in the total costs due to
the location of production:
TCHω = cωqω + δHzωqω + θz
2
ω






ω stand for the total cost of a firm ω located in the home country and off-
shore13. The first terms of the total cost functions capture the variable costs of production as
in standard Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) setting. The second terms with parameters δH and
δO capture the increases in the marginal costs due to the quality upgrades. Those quality
adaptation costs are brought about by the implementation of quality innovations. We as-
sume that the quality-related production costs are always greater for the offshoring firm (δH
12The model can be easily extended to a version where a firm combines a range of the potentially offshorable
tasks in the spirit of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Each firm would then decide on the fraction of
the tasks offshored. However, this complication would not qualitatively change the results of the model.
13Wage in the domestic country is normalized to 1.
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≤ δO), i.e. the greater the geographical distance between the plants and the headquarters,
the more costly is the quality adaptation. Those variable costs entail for instance machines
fine-tuning for the new technology processes, new materials, workers retraining, etc. The
third terms, involving θ’s account for fixed cost of quality innovation, invariant to the quan-
tity produced. They describe firms’ R&D investments, product re-design, the invention of
the new technology processes and so on. Following Antoniades (2015) we assume this cost
to be convex. In principle, we could allow for differences in θ’s across production locations.
However, firms R&D activities are predominantly located in the headquarters, in particular
if the main destination market is the domestic one, therefore we assume θ’s to be equal across
production locations14. Additionally, we assume that the total wage costs are always lower
offshore: wτ < 1.
In such a setting, the problem for a firm producing domestically is identical to the closed
economy solution in Antoniades (2015). Therefore, we solve the problem only for the off-
shoring firm and present the equilibrium outcome.
Denote by cD,O the marginal cost value for which the offshoring firm’s demand is driven to
zero, qω(cD,O) = 0 and zD,O stands for the quality level relative to zD,O. We can now express














(wτ)(cD,O − cω) + L
2γ





(wτ)(cD,O − cω) + (β − δO)(zω − zD,O)
)2
− θ(zω)2 (2.3.6)




(cD,O − cω)(wτ)− zD,O(β − δO)
)
= λO(cD,O − cω)(wτ) (2.3.7)
λO =
L(β − δO)
4γθ − L(β − δO)2
The last passage in (2.3.7) follows from the fact that for cω = cD,O ⇒ zD,O = λO((cD,O −
cD,O)(wτ) − zD,O(β − δO)) ⇒ zD,O = −zD,OλO(β − δO) ⇒ zD,O = 0. Given the optimal
14The earlier version of this paper assumed θH ≤ θO. The qualitative results of both the static and the
dynamic model are identical. The results are available upon request.
15As in Antoniades (2015) firms here choose simultaneously the price and the quality for a given output
level. Given the linearity and separability of the model, we first solve for the optimal price and next, we find
the optimal quality level.
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(wτ)(cD,O + cω) +
1
2




(wτ)(cD,O − cω)(1 + λO(β − δO)) (2.3.9)
piω = (wτ)
2(cD,O − cω)2 L
4γ
(1 + λO(β − δ)) (2.3.10)
This results lead to two parametric assumptions. First, to assure the concavity of profit
piω in quality zω it is required that L(β − δO)2 − 4γθ < 0. Second, in order to impose a
non-negative quality zω we must assume that β > δO. Each firm, given its marginal cost cω,
will be choosing the location of its production by comparing the maximized profits under








(wτ)2(cD,O − cω)2(1 + λO(β − δO)) (2.3.12)
As long as piHω ≥ piOω a given firm with a marginal cost cω would prefer to produce
domestically instead of offshoring. We find that the pivotal firm that is indifferent between
producing domestically and offshoring is characterized by the following marginal cost c1
16:
c1 = cD,Owτ
(ΓH + ΓOwτ + (1− wτ)√ΓHΓO





L(β−δh)−4γθ and ΓO =
θ(β+4γ−δo)+L(δo−β)
L(β−δo)−4γθ . It is easy to show that under
the model parametric restrictions, it is always the case that c1 < cD,H < cD,O. In Figure 2.2
we present the equilibrium location choices.
The firms with the marginal costs below the cost cutoff c1 produce in the home country,
whereas the firms with the marginal costs above this threshold produce offshore. cD,H is the
critical cost cutoff originating from the closed economy model of Antoniades (2015), where
firms with marginal costs above cD,H exit the market. The introduction of the offshoring
possibility results in a new critical cost cutoff, cD,O, cD,O > cD,H . This implies that thanks
to offshoring we observe in equilibrium some firms with a very low productivity (with their
marginal costs falling into [cD,H , cD,O] interval) that without an offshoring option would not
16See the derivation in section 2.6.1 in the Appendix.
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Figure 2.2: Static model equlibrium.
be able to survive. This can be rationalized along the theory presented in Rodriguez-Lopez
(2012) who describes the two forces behind the offshoring decisions: a Schumpeterian effect,
i.e. selection effects a´ la Melitz that drive out the least productive firms from the market and
an escape-from-competition effect17 which increases the offshore profits and makes offshoring
attractive exactly for the less productive firms. Moreover, for the firms whose marginal cost
lays between c1 and cD,H offshoring leads to a higher profits.






piOω dG(c) = fe (2.3.14)
This condition determines the cost cutoff cD,O. Following Melitz (2003), Melitz and Ot-
taviano (2008) and Antoniades (2015) we assume that the firm cost draws are Pareto dis-





. The cost cutoff in this economy is:
cD,O =
(
4γfe(k + 1)(k + 2)cM
k





17This effect is based on the earlier innovation and competition literature, see Aghion et al. (2005).





, χ is the constant
multiplying cutoff c1 (equation (2.3.13)) and λH =
L(β−δH)




Let us now analyze the firm location decision in a two-period setting. Analogously to the
static formulation, offshoring comprises a tradeoff between lower wages costs and a higher
quality-related production costs. The timing of the events is as follows: firstly all firms
pay the entry cost, fe, and draw the marginal cost cω from the common distribution G(c).
Firm productivity is invariant across the periods. Next, given the realized value of cω firms
decide the quantities produced, the quality upgrades and the production location in both
periods. Finally the production takes place. Each firm can choose to produce always in the
home country, to always offshore, to reshore in the second period or to offshore in the second
period. Given the realized marginal cost, cω and the location choice, the firms experience
different marginal costs of production. They choose the profit maximizing scenario.
Denote by i ∈ {Home(H), Offshore(O)} a firm’s location decision in the first period and









ω,1−cωT i−δizi,jω,1)−θi(zi,jω,1)2+qi,jω,2(pi,jω,2−cωT j−δi(zi,jω,1+∆i,jω ))−θj(∆i,jω )2
(2.4.1)
where qi,jω,1 and q
i,j
ω,2 stand for the quantity in the first and second period, z
i,j
ω,1 is the quality
level in the first period and ∆i,jω is the second period quality upgrade. The fixed costs of
quality innovation are convex and paid only on the per period quality upgrade (i.e. the first
period innovation cost is θi(z
i,j
ω,1)




and T j are the payroll costs, conditional on the location choice. For home production the
wages are normalized to 1, TH = 1. On the other hand, the offshore labor costs include the
offshore wages (assumed to be lower than the home wages, w < 1) and an iceberg cost of
shipping the goods back to the home country (τ > 1) TO = wτ . Denoting the period by
t ∈ {1, 2}, the inverse demand function is expressed in a standard way:




As before, we can express the optimal quantities and prices, and the maximized profit as the
18In principle the innovation costs are symmetric for both the quality upgrades and downgrades, however,
in equilibrium the latter choice is absent.
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In the equations (2.4.3) - (2.4.7) ci,jD,1 and c
i,j
D,2 are the marginal cost cutoff values for a firm
making a location decision {i, j} in period 1 and 2, respectively. A firm with a marginal
cost cω, cω > c
i,j
D,1 (cω > c
i,j
D,2) will not be producing in period 1 (period 2). z
i,j
D,1 and





respectively. While in the static model zD is zero in equilibrium, in the dynamic model it is
not necessarily the case. This is the dynamic feature due to a two period horizon combined
with the convexity of quality innovation costs. Consider a firm’s with a marginal cost cω
such that it is equal to ci,jD,1 and lower than c
i,j
D,2: it does not produce in the first period, but
it produces in the second one. However, despite no production in the first period, it engages
in quality enhancing investments, as it would allow for the highest quality upgrade at the
lowest possible cost in the following period. As in the static formulation, the optimal quality
choice in every period can be found by maximizing (2.4.7) with respect to zi,jω,1 and ∆
i,j
ω :









T j(ci,jD,2 − c)− zi,jD,2(β − δj)
))
(2.4.8)










(ci,jD,2 − c)T j − zi,jD,2(β − δj)
))
(2.4.9)







(β − δj)(L(β − δi)− 4γθjλiλj(β − δj))
λj ≡ L(β − δj)
4γθj − L(β − δj)2
λi ≡ L(β − δi)
4γθi − L(β − δi)2
By imposing c = ci,jD,1 and c = c
i,j
D,2 in the equations (2.4.8) and (2.4.9). We are left with a
system of two equations which enables us to express zi,jD,1 and z
i,j





and parameters. Therefore, we can rewrite equations (2.4.3) -(2.4.9) as follows:
qi,jω,1 = 2Φi,j(c
i,j
D,1 − cω)L(β − δj)
(
T jθj(β − δi) + T i θi
λj
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ci,jD,1L(β − δj)(β − δi)
(T iθi
λj
− θj(T i(β − δj)− T j(β − δi))
)
+
+ ci,jD,2L(β − δj)(β − δi)
(Tj
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(T jL(β − δj)(β − δi)
λi
+ 4γθj(T
i(β − δi) + T j(β − δj))
)) (2.4.16)
In each period t firms with the marginal cost cω above cost cutoff value cD,t will not
produce. They exit the market (i.e. they engage neither in any production, nor in any
quality investments) if cω > max{ci,jD,1, ci,jD,2}. For the sake of clarity of the exposition from
now onward we restrict the attention only to the firms that are producing in both periods,
i.e. cω ≤ min{ci,jD,1, ci,jD,2}, for given {i, j} location choice. The entry of firms is unrestricted
and the firms enter until the expected profit is driven to zero.
Note that the maximum price a firm can quote is bounded and it is associated with zero





























ω,t dω, t ∈ {1, 2} and it stands for the consumption level over all varieties
in period t. As in our setup the only destination market is the home country market, in
equilibrium Q1 and Q2 are unique and common for all the production location scenarios.
Considering the all possible location choices, the equations (2.4.17) generate a system. Once
the system is solved, we can express all the performance measures (2.4.3) -(2.4.9) and the
maximized profits as the functions of the model parameters and Q1 and Q2
19. We can write
the conditions that fully specify the equilibrium as:
19To be found in the Appendix.
































































, k ∈ {1, 2, 3,M}
where i?, j? are the optimal location choices. c˜k for k ∈ {1, 2, 3} are the profit cutoffs between
4 potential location scenarios. c˜M is the maximum value for the marginal cost. As profit
functions are convex, there are at most 3 cutoffs, however in equilibrium we do not necessarily
observe all of them. Πi
?,j?
k,ω (cω) for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} stand for the maximal profit for a given
interval of the marginal cost and Θ stands for the model parameter set. G(c) is the common
cost distribution, assumed to be Pareto for productivity 1
c






(2.4.18) describes each firm’s optimal location decision {i, j} as the choice of the scenario
under which the maximized joint two period profit is the greatest. Equation (2.4.19) is the
standard Free Entry condition, bounded by the requirement that the firms should produce in
both of the two periods (thus restrictions on c˜). (2.4.20) is the condition closing the model,
stating the aggregate equilibrium consumption levels of Q1 and Q2.





a large set of model parameters20 the model cannot be solved analytically. Instead, we solve
it by means of the numeric methods. The numerical solution procedure is based on the fixed
point theorem. We proceed as follows: given a set of parameter values, we initially guess the
values of Q1 and Q2 and we find the relative profit-maximizing location choices {i?, j?} for
each cω ∈ [0, cM ]. Next, we compute the Free Entry condition (2.4.19) and verify whether
the guessed values of Q1 and Q2 overlap with their model-based counterparts, i.e. whether
(2.4.20) holds. If not, the guess on Q1 and Q2 is updated. We repeat this procedure by
iterating over the combinations of the parameter values.
We would assume, similarly to the formulation in the static model in the previous section
that a firm’s fixed cost of the quality innovation is invariant both to the production location
and timing, i.e. θi = θj = θ. As argued before, θ’s stand for the R&D-related quality
20Θ ≡ {α, β, δH , δO, η, γ, θH , θO, w, τ, L}
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investments, that are most likely to take place in the headquarters. Moreover, the reshoring
phenomenon does not address the re-location of R&D activities, but it is concentrated in
the component manufacturing business. Modeling the choice of R&D location is beyond
the scope of this model. Moreover, it is easy to show that in the dynamic setting firm’s
quality choice in the first period is always greater than the subsequent quality upgrade in
the following period. Therefore, if θ’s would differ accordingly to the production location,
the firms would always choose to remain in the first period in the location offering lower
fixed quality costs. As a consequence, if the quality innovation costs are greater offshore, the
firms initially choose to produce domestically, build-up the quality stock in the first period
and finally offshore. We would not observe any reshoring activity whatsoever, which is at
odds with the data.
2.4.1 Equilibrium Results
The numerical solution delivers reshoring in equilibrium. The equilibrium is characterized
by a sorting pattern into production location choices according to the individual firm pro-
ductivity: the most productive firms (with the lowest marginal cost draws, cω) always decide
to produce in the home country, whereas the least productive (with the highest marginal
cost draws) always offshore. Reshoring arises for the intermediate values of productivity.
For illustration, in Figure 2.3 we present one parametrization that delivers a reshoring equi-
librium. Firms within the area A choose production at home, firms from the region C
choose production offshore, whereas the intermediate productivity firms ( region B) are the
reshorers. For the reshoring firms the first period benefits from lower offshore wages outweigh
higher offshore quality adaptations costs. However, when the quality upgrade in the second
period materializes, the quality adaptations costs abroad rise as well and those firms prefer
to transfer the production back to the domestic country21.
In Figure 2.4 we present the reshoring equilibrium sensitivity to the variations in the taste for
quality parameter (β) and to the degree of product differentiation (γ). When the consumer’s
love for quality increases two effects take place (panel 2.4a). First, there is an increase of
the interval of the productivity where reshoring is an equilibrium outcome, ceteris paribus.
Secondly, the equilibrium reshoring takes place for a lower productivity firms, ceteris paribus.
Intuitively, as the consumers in the home country value quality more and more, the scope
for reshoring is also growing. The opposite effects happen for an increase in the degree of
product differentiation, γ (panel 2.4b). First, in the more differentiated sectors reshoring is
less likely to occur and more and more firms choose to offshore the production in both peri-
21Arguably, the production transfer across countries can entail an important fixed costs, from which our
framework abstracts. However, an introduction of fixed offshore or/and fixed reshoring costs would not alter
qualitatively the main results of the model.
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Figure 2.3: Reshoring equilibrium illustration.
ods. Secondly, in the more differentiated sectors, reshoring takes place for more productive
firms. Increase in the degree pf product differentiation decreases the importance of quality
in the choice of the consumers. The consumers are now more interested in different goods
than similar goods with different quality, thus there is less and less incentive for firms to
increase the quality. This fall in quality induces a decrease in profits and an increase in the
number of firms deciding to offshore all the periods. Summing up, the model predicts that
reshoring should be more prevalent in the sectors characterized by a lower degree of product
differentiation and a higher taste for quality.
In Figure 2.5 we present equilibrium sensitivity to the variations in the quality cost structure.
In the panel 2.5a there are plotted reshoring equilibrium changes due to an increase in the
variable costs of producing quality, δO. The reaction pattern is non-monotonic. Initially, for
low values of δO ( when δH is close in value to δO) the reshoring activity is more likely to
occur, and it takes place for lower productivity firms. However, when the quality production
becomes very costly (for δO sufficiently higher than δH), the reshoring interval starts to
shrink and eventually it vanishes. Increasing the quality adaptation costs decrease the net
benefits from the offshore production, ceteris paribus. In the limiting case, when the quality
production is prohibitively expensive, we would observe only the home producing firms. On
the other hand, in the panel 2.5b there are plotted the equilibrium changes due to variations
in θ. It describes the cost of quality innovation, i.e. the new design expenses, R&D outlays,
the machinery replacement costs, etc. An increase in θ results in the reshoring activity being
less and less likely to occur and taking place for more and more productive firms. This is
because rising θ reduces the net benefits from the investments in the quality and depresses
Chapter2 71
Figure 2.4: Reshoring equilibria. Comparative statics (I).
(a) taste for quality, β
(b) degree of product differentiation, γ
the profits for all the firms, but most prominently for the home producers. In the limiting
case, when the quality innovation is very costly we would observe all the firms producing
only offshore.
In Figure 2.6 we present the comparative statics exercise for wages, w (panel 2.6a) and the
transport cost parameter, τ (panel 2.6b). Qualitatively, the impact of an increase in wages or
a rise in the transportation cost is similar, as those parameters jointly describe the effective
unit labor cost of the offshore labor. Increase in w or in τ decrease the profits of the firms
producing at least one period abroad. When offshoring is more expensive, a higher number of
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Figure 2.5: Reshoring equilibria. Comparative statics (II).
(a) offshore quality adaptation cost, δO
(b) quality innovation cost, θ
firms will decide to produce in the US and to reshore, also, alongside increasing w and τ , we
observe less and less productive firms transferring their offshored production back because
the most productive ones are incentivized to produce at home in both of the periods.
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Figure 2.6: Reshoring equilibria. Comparative statics (III).
(a) offshore wage, w
(b) transportation costs, τ
Finally, in Figure 2.7 we report how the reshoring equilibrium reacts to the changes in the
market size, L. Similarly to the impact of an increasing offshore wages and a rise in the
transportation costs, an increase in the market size results in the reshoring activity taking
place for less and less productive firms. As the market size grows, the scope for quality
differentiation increases22, the firms invest more in quality and experience higher profits.
22An increase in the scope for quality differentiation leading to a higher optimal quality choice by the firms
is one of the main findings in Antoniades (2015).
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Figure 2.7: Reshoring equilibria. Comparative statics (IV): market size, L
2.5 Conclusions
We present a novel theory explaining the recent phenomenon of reshoring. We develop a
dynamic model of heterogeneous firms choosing both the quantity and the quality of the
good, and deciding on the production location. Quality production is attractive as con-
sumers are willing to pay a higher price for the higher quality good, yet quality production
is costly. Offshoring offers a way for reducing the payroll costs, however it comprises quality
production costs greater than the domestic manufacturing. The model generates the equilib-
rium reshoring of production and yields an equilibrium sorting pattern with reshoring arising
for the intermediate values of productivity. Comparative statics exercises suggest that the
reshoring activity is more prevalent in sectors with lower degrees of product differentiation
and exhibiting higher love for quality. We leave the empirical verification of those hypotheses
for the future research.
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2.6 Appendix
Full Sample Reshorers KFO
No. % No. % No. %
1995 1 0,16 . . 1 0,44
1997 1 0,16 1 0,24 . .
1999 1 0,16 . . 1 0,44
2001 2 0,31 1 0,24 1 0,44
2002 1 0,16 . . 1 0,44
2003 2 0,31 2 0,49 . .
2005 1 0,16 . . 1 0,44
2006 3 0,47 2 0,49 1 0,44
2007 6 0,94 4 0,98 2 0,88
2008 19 2,98 11 2,69 8 3,51
2009 32 5,02 19 4,65 13 5,70
2010 34 5,34 27 6,6 7 3,07
2011 76 11,93 41 10,02 35 15,35
2012 101 15,86 76 18,58 25 10,96
2013 185 29,04 108 26,41 77 33,77
2014 140 21,98 95 23,23 45 19,74
2015 30 4,71 20 4,89 10 4,39
2016 2 0,31 2 0,49 . .
Total 637 100 409 100 228 100,00
Observations 637 409 228
Table 2.2: The year of reshoring, different samples
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Figure 2.8: Reshoring firms by industry
Domestic factor % of companies








Lower real-estate/construction costs 0,97
Supplier issues 0,49
Table 2.3: Main domestic factors behind reshoring decision for US firms
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2.6.1 Static model: equilibrium cost cutoff






(cD,H − cω)2(1 + λH(β − δH)) > L
4γ
(wτ)2(cD,O − cω)2(1 + λO(β − δO))
(c2D,O − 2cD,Ocω + c2ω)(
4θOγ
4θOγ − L(β − δO)2 ) > (c
2
D,O − 2cD,Ocω(wτ) + c2ω(wτ)2)(
4θOγ
4θOγ − L(β − δO)2 )
(c2D,H − 2cD,Hcω + c2ω)(
θH
4θHγ − L(β − δH)2 ) > (c
2
D,H − 2cD,Hcω(wτ) + c2ω(wτ)2)(
θO
4θOγ − L(β − δO)2 )
(c2D,H − 2cD,Hcω + c2ω)(ΓH) >(c2D,H − 2cD,Hcω(wτ) + c2ω(wτ)2)(ΓO)
where ΓH ≡ θH
4θHγ − L(β − δH)2 , ΓO ≡
θO
4θOγ − L(β − δO)2
⇔ c2ω(ΓH − (wτ)2ΓO)− 2cωcD,H(ΓH − (wτ)ΓO) + c2D,H(ΓH − ΓO) > 0 (2.6.1)
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Chapter 3
Export Upgrade and
Global Value Chains Participation
Abstract
This study provides the evidence suggesting that a more intensive integration into global pro-
duction networks (GVCs) via forward linkages offers a potential for the increase in the quality
of exports, in particular for the developing economies. Our analysis relates the sector-level
GVCs participation indicators derived from the international OECD Input-Output Tables
to the data on the unit values of exports at the product-exporter level. The sample consists
of 63 economies observed between 2000 and 2011. We find a strong association between the
export prices and GVCs forward participation, in particular for the developing countries. We
document also a less robust negative relationship between the GVCs backward participation
and unit values of exports. The findings suggest that the driver behind the quality-improving
role of the forward linkages are the exports to the rich markets and technologically advanced
sectors.1
Keywords: Export Upgrade, Global Value Chains, Product Quality, Unit Values
JEL Classification: F10, F14, F23, F60
1This paper is a work in progress. We would like to thank to Stefano Bolatto, David Collie, Gianmarco
Ottaviano, Paolo Manasse and the participants of internal seminars at University of Bologna and Cardiff
University for their constructive comments at the various stages of this work.
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3.1 Introduction
The positive association between economic growth and trade is a well-established fact in the
economic literature. However recently, starting from the seminal work by Hausmann et al.
(2007) and Hausmann and Hidalgo (2011), the focus of interest for both academics and pol-
icymakers has shifted away from the mere export volumes toward the export composition
and their sophistication. From a firm perspective, certain product quality is often a prereq-
uisite for successful exporting, which itself can further lead to learning by doing productivity
and quality gains. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that many countries actively pursue
industrial policies aimed explicitly at upgrading their production structure, with a particular
emphasis put on the exports.
Simultaneously, the factor that dominated international trade and development policy of the
last two decades are Global Value Chains (GVCs), a broad term related to the processes
of production fragmentation and production sharing, vertical integration, task offshoring
and outsourcing, and measurement of trade in value added. As Pascal Lamy, the former
WTO chief put it: Any discussion today of international trade and investment policy that
fails to acknowledge the centrality of global value chains would be considered outmoded and
of questionable relevance.2 Yet the benefits stemming from joining the GVCs are neither
self-evident, nor unconditional. Many high income countries fear that the GVCs-related
relocation of labour-intensive, lower-value tasks into developing countries would result in
the loss of value added and jobs. Also, although the core nature of the modern GVCs is
the transfer of innovation stimulating know-how, a critical and a necessary first step toward
product upgrades (Taglioni and Winkler (2016)), many lower income economies approach
the GVCs-related policy with caution. They want to avoid getting stuck at low-value added
tasks, which could undermine the prospects for quality advancements and, subsequently, for
the future growth.
To contribute to this debate this paper aims at investigating whether GVCs participa-
tion through forward/selling linkages and backward/buying linkages influenced the product
quality of the exports3. In addition, we try to shed some light onto channels of the potential
impact of GVCs participation on the unit values of exports as we test whether the host
country level of development, the source/destination country and source/destination sector
matter for the outcomes. Due to data availability on the trade in value added, it is only
recently that this question can be addressed in a rigorous manner.
2Elms and Low (2013)
3Product quality is measured as unit value at exporting country-product-year level. Backward (buying)
linkages in GVCs can be broadly defined as the amount of foreign value added in the home country exports,
whereas the forward (selling) linkages are the amount of domestic value added in the foreign countries exports
(or re-exports).
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Integration into GVCs can lead to export upgrading via many channels. First, firms can
benefit from a direct interaction within GVCs. A more intense forward (selling) linkages as
could require suppliers to upgrade the products as a result of compliance with tighter foreign
quality norms (for instance via submitting specific certifications, meeting standards, passing
technical audits) which would manifest in higher unit values. Similar outcomes could be
triggered thanks to access to foreign high quality inputs leading to quality improvements
and products of higher unit values. Eventually, thanks to combination of a scale-effect,
a GVCs-related transfer of know-how and access to better inputs firms can also upgrade
functionally. As an example think of a domestic subcontractor in a textile industry moving
from assembling an imported pre-cut trousers to producing and exporting the pre-packaged
product, which would also manifest in higher unit values. Second, GVCs integration can
affect the unit values of the exports indirectly, due to industry spillover effects, sectoral
competition forces or imitation of good practices observed among their counterparts involved
in an international production network. An intensified GVCs trade within a sector can
have an impact on competition, both via extensive and intensive margins. As a result of
increased competition, the least productive exporters (or products) may drop of the market,
somewhat mechanically leading to an export upgrade. However, as outlined in Antoniades
(2015) firms may respond differently to a higher competition in presence of a high scope
for quality differentiation, conditional on their productivity. Within modeling framework of
Antoniades (2015) in highly differentiated markets an increase in competition incentivizes the
most productive firms to upgrade and the least productive firms to downgrade the quality.
The overall impact of increased competition would then depend on the degree of quality
differentiation and firm productivity distribution, and ultimately it remains an empirical
question.
In this paper, by exploiting the new International Input-Output Tables (ICIO) by the
OECD and a high-quality dataset on the trade in unit values, we show that there is a strong,
positive and economically meaningful association between forward GVCs linkages and the
unit value of exports that holds across all levels of development. We also find a less robust
negative association between backward GVCs linkages and unit values of exports. The
specifications and robustness checks addressing the question of potential reverse causality
result in a corroboration of a strong and positive relationship between export quality and
selling linkages, particularly present for the developing countries subsample. On the other
hand, the negative association between backward GVCs linkages and unit values of exports
is found to be less robust.
A finer look at the estimates reveals interesting patterns related to GVCs sourcing/destination
country and GVCs sourcing/destination sector. We find that forward linkage impact on the
developing countries export prices is mostly due to selling to the richer and more technolog-
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ically advanced markets. Additionally, we find that the advanced economies gain the most
in terms of the unit values of exports when selling to high-tech sectors, whereas the devel-
oping countries benefit both from supplying to high-tech and low-tech sectors. As for the
backward linkage, we find that no single country group or sector grouping is responsible for
the negative effect. However, we find that sourcing from low and middle income economies
in particular leads to lower export unit values of the intermediate goods.
Last but not least, we present additional evidence suggesting that the increase in the
unit values of exports we document is indeed a quality upgrade, not a mere increase in the
mark-ups. We show that the increase in the unit values of exports is accompanied by an
increase in the unit values of imports of the intermediate goods. Interestingly, the decrease
in the unit values related to backward GVCs linkages is accompanied by a simultaneous
decrease in the unit values of imports.
This paper is structured in the following way: the next subsection presents the relevant
related literature. Section 3.2 describes the datasets used in the analysis and outlines the
empirical specification. Section 3.3 presents the main results and the robustness checks, and
section 3.4 concludes.
3.1.1 Related Literature
To my best knowledge this paper is the first one to rigorously study the relationship between
GVCs participation and export upgrade in a wide range of countries. The major body of
literature on the GVCs has focused so far on the development of the novel vertical special-
ization indicators, description of their geographical evolution and a subsequent reevaluation
of gross trade patterns4. Hummels et al. (2001) show that the vertical specialization mea-
sured as foreign value added in exports has increased on average by 30% between 1970 and
1990, based on OECD input-output tables for years 1970− 1990. Their analysis is updated
and complemented by Daudin et al. (2011) who report also a massive increase in GVCs
trade when looking at the selling (forward) linkages, i.e.: the domestic value added in third
countries exports for years 1997− 2004. Most recently, Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015)
present a portrait of the global pattern of supply-chain and its evlolution since 1995, based
on World Input-Output Databse (WIOD). They discuss three components of value added
trade: importing to produce (i2p), importing to export (i2e) and factor content trade (va)
and via a myriad of different indicators they make a strong case for a largely increased in-
ternationalization of production since 1995. Lately, Piermartini and Rubinova (2014) show
that GVCs trade facilitates knowledge transfers and potentially can pave the way for a faster
economic development. This paper, complements this finding by showing the association be-
4See Amador and Cabral (2016) for a detailed survey on measuring GVCs.
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tween forward and backward linkages and export structure upgrade.
Despite scarcity of the empirical evidence on export upgrade within the GVCs literature,
there exist many studies documenting a positive relationship between FDI and unit values
of exports. Among others, Swenson and Chen (2014) in a study of Chinese firms show a
positive association between the presence of multinational companies and higher unit value
transactions in the same industry. In a companion paper Swenson (2008) documents that
the presence of multinationals increases the number of new export connections by private
Chinese exporters, which may be due to information spillovers. In a work closely related
to this paper, Harding and Javorcik (2012) study the impact of FDI inflow on the export
upgrade in a cross-country setting, exploiting the data on sectors targeted by investment
promotion agencies. They document an increase of approx. 11% in unit values of exports
across the targeted sectors in developing countries. They attribute the increase to the up-
grade of final goods and more differentiated goods, finding no impact on the intermediates.
Interestingly, this paper finds that sectors with a greater exposure to GVCs trade5 have
recorded an increase in unit values of both the intermediate and final goods exports.
3.2 Data and empirical strategy
3.2.1 GVCs participation: forward and backward linkages
The measures of forward and backward participation in GVCs are based on the International
Input-Output Tables from the OECD (ICIO). Their most recent release (April 2017) offers
a broad coverage of the middle and low income economies, in particular when compared to
the alternative sources of trade in value added data like WIOD. 2017 ICIO release covers
63 economies in years 1995 − 2011 and it contains 34 Isic Rev.3 industries. This analysis
restricts the sample start to year 2000, due to data availability of the unit values database.
As the dataset on the unit values of exports does not cover trade in services, we additionally
restrict the analysis to 16 manufacturing sectors.
In the following analysis, we refer to forward or selling linkage as the value of domestic
value added subsequently re-exported to the third countries (exporting to re-export) and
to backward or buying linkage as the value of foreign value added embodied in the home
exports (importing to export).
To obtain the GVCs participation measures we use the classical Leontief decomposition of
the international Input-Output Tables. The routine for the decomposition is implemented
in R and thoroughly documented by the authors in Quast and Kummritz (2015). The final
5GVCs trade is a term more broad than sectoral FDI presence as firms entering GVCs can be both
multinational affiliates as well as arm’s length buyers/suppliers without an ownership relationship.
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product of the Leontief decomposition is a matrix, say V , where each cell vjsli ∈ V is an
estimate for the industry s country i value added originating from industry j in country l.
We therefore define the backward linkage of an industry s in country i as the sum of all the
foreign value added from all the foreign countries l and sectors j used in exports of the sector







Analogously, the forward linkage in industry s, country i is defined as the domestic value
added in exports re-exported to all the industries j of all the third countries l (in other words







In order to avoid spurious effects of the oil imports, we exclude from the indices all the value
added sourced from the mining sector (Isic Rev. 3, ICIO code C10T14). The summary
statistics of backward and forward linkages are presented in Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for GVC indicators
Indicator Mean Std Dev. Std Dev. Min Max Obs
(within)
backward linkage (fva) 4.83 3.78 0.51 -9.95 10.91 10584
forward linkage (dva) 3.97 5.47 0.46 -20.48 10.15 10584
All GVC indicators in natural logs.
Chapter3 87
3.2.2 Unit Values
Export quality is proxied by the unit values of exported goods6. Data on unit values are taken
from Trade in Value Added database (TUV) from Cepii7. This database relies on United
Nations (UN) Statistical Division dataset on Tariff Lines, corresponding to the values and
quantities of trade declared by individual countries to the UN. Data are processed in order
to provide reliable and comparable unit values across countries. Unit values of exports are
used in this analysis. They are Free on Board prices, computed for each exporter, partner
and product at the highest level of disaggregation reported in the Tariff Lines dataset.
Processing methodology adopted improves the reliability and comparability of the unit values
as compared to the alternative product-destination data (such as UN Comtrade). Crucially,
in TUV missing values of exported quantity for the entries with non-missing trade value are
estimated. The estimation procedure is a departure from the standard one using a unique
world unit value, defined at world level. Conversely, in TUV estimation of missing quantities
there is no reliance on the world unit value and therefore heterogeneity in pricing across
different countries is preserved. Secondly, TUV tackles some of the typical aggregation
issues which arise when working with unit values: Comtrade aggregates separately values
and quantities into HS 6-digits nomenclature. This can bias unit values when some of the
quantity information is initially missing at a higher level of disaggregation. In our database
[TUV], unit values, rather than the values themselves are computed at the highest level of
disaggregation before aggregation in HS 6-digits categories, thus reducing the bias due to
separate aggregation of values and quantities. (Berthou and Emlinger (2011))
Given the strict methodology applied in the construction of TUV, its coverage both in terms
of products and countries is slightly smaller than Comtrade. Importantly, the TUV data
starts in year 2000, which would mean that we are forced to restrict our sample start period
to year 2000.
For the analysis we collapse the product-exporter-destination dimension of the TUV dataset
to product-exporter one. We aggregate all destination-specific unit values for each product-
exporter pair by using the trade value weights inferred from BACI Cepii database.
6Although the unit values of exports are not a perfect proxy for export quality, it has been a widely
adopted measure in the literature (see Schott (2004), Fitzgerald and Hallak (2004), Harding and Javorcik
(2012) among others). Unit values may suffer from measurement error and aggregation issues, and can
vary for a number of reasons, not necessarily reflecting the quality. If the threat is related to unit values
reflecting production costs, then the inclusion of country-specific controls such as GDP per capita in the
specification should account for that. If the threat is related to market power, to the extent that the market
power of a country exporting a product to a given destination is not time-varying, the product-exporter fixed
effect should take care of this issue. The aggregation and measurement error are typically the most difficult
problems to deal with, yet the design of TUV dataset is directly aimed at tackling those issues, as explained
in the main text.
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TUV database does not provide any split into final and intermediate goods. The aim of this
paper is to study the impact of GVCs-induced upgrade of the exports and therefore we would
like also to investigate the potentially differential impact of GVCs trade on the intermediates
and final goods. Therefore, we turn to the United Nations Broad Economic categories (UN
BEC) Classification by end use to distinguish final goods from the intermediates. UN BEC
maps all six-digit HS codes into 19 basic categories of goods: six categories of consumption
goods, two categories of capital goods, eight categories of intermediate goods and three non-
specified categories. In the subsequent analysis we restrict our attention to intermediate and
consumption goods only.
To illustrate the recent changes in export unit values we consider the largest increases
in the export prices in a cross-country comparison. Table (3.13) in the Appendix lists 35
countries that have recorded the greatest surges in unit values of exports. We compute the
changes in unit values as changes in unit value of a product p, exported by a country c
averaged across country c′s export basket in between year 2011 (sample end) and year 2000
(sample start). We exclude countries exporting less than 30 products. The largest increases
in export prices have been recorded in Japan (383%), Tunisia (336%), Poland (282%), Hun-
gary (266%), Switzerland (247%) and the Czech Republic (235%). Both among the top 10
and top 20 economies, the positions were split almost equally between low and middle income
and high income countries8. Interestingly, among the low and middle income group there is
a particular concentration of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries9. In the last
decade most of CEE countries have been intensively integrating into global but predomi-
nantly regional production networks, most notably creating business relationships with rich
European headquarters economies (Germany, France) within so-called factory Europe (Bald-
win (2016)). Table (3.2) reports the largest increases in unit values of product p exported by
country c for country-sector pairs. We exclude sectors exporting less than 10 products. The
last two columns of Table (3.2) describe the changes in GVC indices: forward and backward
linkages, calculated in line with subsection 3.2.1. The top increases in unit values of exports
across sector-country pairs are of a large magnitude, with the record Lithuanian Chemicals
and chemicals products enjoying a 1133% rise in unit values. Increases in Rubber and plastic
products sector dominate the list. The changes in GVC indices accompanying unit values
evolution over the studied period suggest that in principle increases in export prices have
been associated with a growing interconnectedness, both on the selling side (forward) as well
as on the buying side (backward). Notable exceptions are Irish Rubber and plastic prod-
ucts and New Zealand’s Chemicals and chemical products which have enjoyed an increase in
8Classification after World Bank as of year 2000.
9CEE economies present in top 20 list are: Poland (POL), Hungary (HUN), the Czech Republic, Estonia
(EST) and Lithuania (LTU). Croatia (HRV) ranks 33rd.
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Table 3.2: Changes in unit values 2000− 2011
Rank Country
Unit Value
Sector code and description
forward l. backward l.
% change % change % change
1 LTU 1133.48 8. Chemicals and chemical products 789.68 2329.59
2 AUT 960.55 9. Rubber and plastics products 117.35 98.42
3 FRA 822.62 18. Other manufacturing 130 255.21
4 TUN 596.33 11. Basic metals 672.39 835.55
5 TUN 574.13 12. Fabricated metal products 530.14 870.19
6 POL 566.69 13. Machinery and equip. 620.03 867.65
7 BEL 541.26 9. Rubber and plastics products 91.8 76.55
8 EST 523.3 9. Rubber and plastics products 453.59 409.57
9 IRL 501 10. Other non-metallic mineral products -43.52 -44.46
10 GRC 495.21 9. Rubber and plastics products 210.42 326.14
11 IRL 485.27 9. Rubber and plastics products 64.24 111.16
12 ESP 469.52 9. Rubber and plastics products 139.68 130.78
13 KOR 447.16 9. Rubber and plastics products -20.82 20.49
14 POL 436.35 8. Chemicals and chemical products 390.17 441.45
15 LTU 431.69 15. Electrical machinery and apparatus 194.27 247.18
16 FIN 417.87 11. Basic metals 288.22 147.95
17 EST 407.6 11. Basic metals 1278.28 834.53
18 POL 398.7 12. Fabricated metal products 518.8 535.22
19 POL 398.3 11. Basic metals 286.18 327.75
20 USA 394.72 9. Rubber and plastics products 92.86 122.4
21 THA 388.33 9. Rubber and plastics products 110.93 121
22 EST 386.41 13. Machinery and equip. 407.14 270.04
23 EST 385.69 6. Paper products, printing and publishing 390.84 363.4
24 USA 384.74 10. Other non-metallic mineral products 34.4 98.17
25 LTU 377.95 13. Machinery and equip. 434.92 507.14
26 TUN 373.56 13. Machinery and equip. 488.22 480.82
27 HRV 362.71 11. Basic metals 161.96 115.33
28 LTU 360.08 11. Basic metals 394.35 329.45
29 NLD 359.66 9. Rubber and plastics products 57.65 41
30 NZL 349.41 8. Chemicals and chemical products -63.73 -52.96
31 CZE 345.5 11. Basic metals 456.1 323.71
32 CHE 339.49 9. Rubber and plastics products 102.12 114.55
33 LTU 337.73 9. Rubber and plastics products 539.14 491.6
34 THA 335.8 11. Basic metals 245.91 722.93
35 DEU 333.97 9. Rubber and plastics products 134.48 229.53
36 HRV 321.27 13. Machinery and equip. 315.04 220.23
37 HUN 319.8 6. Paper products, printing and publishing 190.26 159.73
38 CZE 319.08 10. Other non-metallic mineral products 261.4 101.22
39 SVN 318.91 14. Computer, electronic and optical equip. 78.1 45.58
40 LTU 306.32 10. Other non-metallic mineral products 195.74 436.95
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export unit values with a simultaneous decrease in GVCs-related trade.
3.2.3 Other data sources
The detailed list of all control variables altogether with sources can be find in Table (3.14)
the Appendix.
3.2.4 Specification
The relationship between a more intense GVCs trade and unit values upgrade can be si-
multaneous in nature. Possibly it is not only that a more intensified trading within GVCs
leads to product quality upgrades, but also the sectors with an already diversified, highly
sophisticated export basket are populated with firms more attractive for foreign customers
or already source more from abroad. It is a very challenging task to come up with an in-
strument for GVC participation that would vary at sectoral level and successfully capture
the difference between forward and backward linkages. Therefore, as a first step towards a
casual interpretation we resort to estimating a specification with lagged GVCs indicators.
To investigate whether the increased participation in GVCs in a given sector affects the unit
values of products exported by this sector we set up the following baseline specification:
lnUV ALpit = β0 + β1lnBackwardsi,t−1 + β2lnForwardsi,t−1 + β3lnExpV alpi,t−1+
+β4lnImpDCpi,t−1 + β5Xi,t−1 + γpi + γpt + pit
(3.2.3)
The dependent variable, lnUV ALpit, are unit values of exported product varying at product
p, exporter country i and year t level. GVCs forward and backward linkages, lnBackward
and lnForward are measured at sector s (ISIC Rev.3), country i, year t level. Additionally,
the specification controls for the size of the exporting industry proxied by the the value
of exports of a given product by a given country, lnExpV alpit. lnImpDC is the value
of intermediate imports destined for domestic consumption (as opposed to intermediate
imports subsequently embodied in the exports) varying at the sector-exporter-year level.
This variable is a proxy for sectoral openness, comparative advantage and size, it captures
different factors that may simultaneously affect both the GVC participation and export
prices and thus mitigates the potential omitted variable issues. Xit stands for the vector of
country-level controls. As suggested by Hummels and Klenow (2005), we control not only
for the country size (GDP per capita), but also for the log of population size. To control
for the potential effect of transfer pricing of multinational (MNEs) corporations we add as
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a covariate country level corporate tax rate10. We also control for the country-level FDI to
GDP. Detailed list of all the summary statistics and data sources is reported in Table (3.14)
in the Appendix.
The richness of the TUV dataset allows for controlling for a number of fixed effect with-
out compromising on the significance. γpi, γpt stand for product-country and product-time
fixed effects, respectively. Product-country fixed effects control for all the observed and un-
observed time-invariant characteristics specific to each product-country pair combination.
In other words, they account for the fact that the unit value of a kilo of pencils may differ
from that of a kilo of semiconductors for reasons different than quality. We include also
product-time fixed effects, γpt which control not only for the differences in unit values across
products, but also for the changes in the relative prices brought about by demand forces or
technological progress, i.e.: if technological progress will cause the semiconductors prices to
fall relatively to the pencils prices, this impact will be absorbed by γpt.
Therefore, the regression is exploiting the within-product-country variation over time. It
is important to note that the regression could be alternatively run on a more aggregated,
sector-country level unit values. Such an aggregation would however exclude the possibility
to explicitly control for the product-specific characteristics.
The variables of interest, lnBackward and lnForward, are at the sector-country-time level,
and our dependent variable is at the more disaggregated product-country-time level. There-
fore, we cluster standard errors at the sector-country-time, following Moulton (1990).
In the analysis Eq. (3.2.3) is often enriched with an interaction of the GVCs indices and
a developing country dummy (LMI), an interaction of the GVCs indices and a intermediate
good dummy (INT ) or an interaction with a differentiated good dummy (DIFF ). Both the
unit value and the GVCs measures are entering the regressions in natural logarithm trans-
formation. Therefore, all the specifications additionally include dummies (not reported in
the tables, extended results available upon request) for the country-sector-year observations
for which the value of a GVCs linkage is equal to zero, so that the interpretation of the
coefficients remains standard.
In the baseline regression (3.2.3), both β1 and β2 are the coefficients of interest. They
describe the magnitude and direction of the impact of an 1 percentage point (1pp) increase
in GVCs participation in a given sector on the unit values of exported products from that
sector. A positive coefficient may be driven by an upgrade in the existing exported products,
by a shift in the export structure towards goods of higher unit values, or by a combination
of these factors.
10In short, transfer pricing is understood as MNEs incentives to shift profits to lower tax locations in order
to save on import tariffs.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Baseline results
The baseline regression results of Eq.(3.2.3) are presented in Table 3.3 below. In column
(1) we report the impact of both forward and backward linkages in the pooled sample of
all the countries. Column (2) additionally distinguishes the effect of forward and backward
linkages for the intermediates goods. In column (3) we investigate the possible differences
between high income and low and middle income economies. Finally, the specification in
column (4) accounts for both the development level and the differences between the final
goods and intermediates.
We find a strong and positive impact of the forward linkages on the unit value of exports.
All the coefficients of the forward linkages are statistically significant at 1% level and in
the baseline specification, a 1pp increase in the GVCs selling linkages is associated with an
increase of unit value of the exports of 0.08%11. The positive effect is present both in the
high income and developing economies, however it is stronger in the latter group (col.(3)
and (4)).
Somewhat surprisingly, we find a strong and negative association between the GVCs
sourcing linkages and unit values of exports. A a 1pp increase in the integration within
GVCs buying network is associated with a decrease of the unit values of exports of 0.06%12.
Interestingly, this negative effect is much stronger across the low and middle economies
(col.(3) and (4)). As we show in the next sections, this result is not driven by the multi-
collinearity concerns, however its strength fades over time in contrast to the forward linkage
impact.
Those effects of the GVCs linkages are economically meaningful. Based on the baseline
coefficients from Table 3.3 the recorded increase in the forward GVCs linkages translates to
an average increase of the unit values of exports of 22.6% over the studied period13.
As for the other control variables, we find a strong and positive correlation between export
unit values and the value of intermediates imports used for domestic consumption. As the
sectors that import more of the inputs for domestic consumption tend to be more productive,
bigger, more open to trade and potentially exhibit greater comparative advantage this result
comes as no surprise. Somewhat interestingly, products with a greater export value tend
to quote lower export prices. We find also a positive correlation between GDP per capita
and product export prices in line with the evidence that the richer countries export higher
11exp(0.0774)-1=0.08, based on col. (1) in Table 3.3.
12exp(0.0548)-1=0.06, based on col. (1) in Table 3.3.
13Forward linkages have increased on average by 283% in the pooled sample between 2000 and 2011.
Respective increases for the low and middle and high income economies are 125% and 874%.
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Table 3.3: Export unit values and GVCs participation: baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val.
backward linkage -0.0548∗∗∗ -0.0456∗∗∗ -0.0377∗∗∗ -0.0104
(.00828) (.0136) (.01) (.0164)
backward l. x LMI -0.0320∗∗∗ -0.0755∗∗∗
(.0121) (.0222)
backward l. x INT -0.0137 -0.0440∗∗
(.0132) (.0183)
backward l. x LMI x INT 0.0693∗∗∗
(.0239)
forward linkage 0.0774∗∗∗ 0.0706∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗ 0.000938
(.00848) (.0169) (.011) (.0184)
forward l. x LMI 0.0618∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(.013) (.0229)
forward l. x INT 0.0102 0.0634∗∗∗
(.0175) (.0204)
forward l. x LMI x INT -0.104∗∗∗
(.0244)
L.Exp. Value, log -0.0290∗∗∗ -0.0291∗∗∗ -0.0291∗∗∗ -0.0291∗∗∗
(.00106) (.00105) (.00106) (.00106)
L.Intm’s imports, log 0.0606∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0564∗∗∗
(.00976) (.00976) (.00973) (.00966)
GDP p.c., log 0.217∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(.0278) (.0278) (.0279) (.0316)
Population, log -0.0600 -0.0585 -0.0574 -0.0522
(.0877) (.0876) (.0871) (.0873)
Corp. tax -0.149∗∗ -0.149∗∗ -0.151∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗
(.0594) (.0594) (.0598) (.0596)
FDI to GDP -0.000215∗∗ -0.000217∗∗ -0.000237∗∗ -0.000217∗∗
(.000091) (.0000911) (.0000921) (.000091)
Product-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1310684 1310684 1310684 1310684
R2-adj. .91 .91 .91 .91
Dep. variable: natural log of unit values of exports at product-exporter-year level. LMI dummy
is equal to 1 for the low and middle income countries. Country development level assigned
after World Bank classification as of 2000. INT is equal to 1 for the intermediate goods.
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at exporter-industry-year level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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goods of a higher quality. There is a negative (yet not significant) association between
population size and unit values of exports. This finding corroborates the evidence from
Hummels and Klenow (2005b), who show that the more labor-abundant countries tend to
export less sophisticated products. Interestingly, the data suggest a negative and significant
correlation between product export prices and national corporate tax rate, which could be
a prima facie evidence for the profit shifting, i.e. tax avoidance exercised by multinational
companies who artificially lower the export prices of their subsidiaries. Finally, the countries
with a greater FDI to GDP share exhibit lower export unit values, however the coefficient
is of a negligible magnitude.
In Table 3.4 we present a slightly modified specification from Eq.(3.2.3) where we consider
the GVCs participation measures also in second and third lag. All the results reported
in Table 3.4 account for the differential effects of GVCs participation on low and middle
income and high income economies and investigate the potential differences between the
intermediates and final goods.
Table 3.4: Export unit values and GVCs participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1 L2 L3
backward linkage -0.0377∗∗∗ -0.0104 -0.0147 -0.000255 0.0217∗ 0.00584
(.01) (.0164) (.0106) (.0176) (.0111) (.0172)
backward l. x LMI -0.0320∗∗∗ -0.0755∗∗∗ -0.0329∗∗ -0.0408 -0.0417∗∗∗ -0.0181
(.0121) (.0222) (.0133) (.0253) (.0137) (.0241)
backward l. x INT -0.0440∗∗ -0.0250 0.0201
(.0183) (.0192) (.0196)
backward l. x INT x LMI 0.0693∗∗∗ 0.0182 -0.0284
(.0239) (.0264) (.0257)
forward linkage 0.0396∗∗∗ 0.000938 -0.000282 -0.0412∗∗ -0.0291∗∗ -0.0474∗∗
(.011) (.0184) (.0117) (.0195) (.0125) (.02)
forward l. x LMI 0.0618∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(.013) (.0229) (.0143) (.0255) (.0147) (.0252)
forward l. x INT 0.0634∗∗∗ 0.0657∗∗∗ 0.0292
(.0204) (.0214) (.0223)
forward l. x INT x LMI -0.104∗∗∗ -0.0684∗∗∗ -0.0216
(.0244) (.0263) (.0268)
Controls
Exp. Value, Intm’s imports for home cons.,
Population, GDP p.c, Corp. tax , FDI to GDP
Product-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1310684 1310684 1178895 1178895 1049532 1049532
R2-adj. .91 .91 .92 .92 .92 .92
Dep. variable: natural log of unit values of exports at product-exporter-year level. Col. (1)− (2), (3)− (4), (5)− (6)
present results with a 1-year, 2-year and 3-year lagged GVC indicators, respectively. LMI dummy is equal to 1 for the
low and middle income countries. Country development level assigned after World Bank classification as of 2000. INT
is equal to 1 for the intermediate goods. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at exporter-industry-year level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
First, we find that the strong positive impact of the forward linkage is robust and persistent.
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The magnitude of the impact declines with the longer lags, yet the coefficients remain positive
and statistically significant. In the specification with a 3 years lag a 1pp increase in the selling
linkages is associated with a 0.06% increase in the unit values of exports. Interestingly, with
a longer lag structure the coefficients suggest a stronger impact for the low and middle
income economies. Second, the negative impact of the sourcing linkage is less robust. It is
present only for the low and middle income countries when using the second and third lag of
the backward measure (Col.(3) and (4)), however, it disappears from the second lag onward
when the intermediate good dummies are included.
The lagged specification of Eq.(3.2.3) along with a rich set of fixed effects is intended
to mitigate the potential reverse causality problems, however, it cannot fully resolve this
problem. To provide a further evidence that the results above are not driven by the reverse
causality problem, we perform a strict exogeneity test as suggested by Wooldridge (2010).
We estimate a modification of Eq.(3.2.3) including lags and leads of backward and forward
linkages. If the sectoral GVCs integration is a consequence of quality upgrade in the respec-
tive sectors and not vice versa, we should observe statistically significant coefficients on the
lead values of GVCs participation.
In Table 3.5 we present the outcome of the test. We see that the positive impact of
selling linkages is driven by both the contemporaneous and past values of forward GVCs
participation, with a slightly stronger effect of the contemporaneous variation. For the
backward measure, a similar pattern is present. It is the lagged and contemporaneous values
driving the effect of backward linkage. Most importantly, neither for forward, nor for the
backward linkage the coefficient on the lead values is statistically significant, suggesting that
the reverse causality is not driving the main results.
In Table 3.6 we present the results of the additional specification tests. First, we address
the potential multicollinearity threat. In the main specification we include the measures of
both forward and backward linkages. However, as the empirical trade literature suggests,
exporting and importing are often the two sides of the same coin. Therefore, while a failure
to include both of the GVCs measures could lead to the omitted variables problem, the
inclusion of both of those proxies could bring about multicollinearity issues. To cross-check
that our results are not influenced by the multicollinearity, in columns (1) and (2) we present
the outcomes of the specifications including each GVCs linkage measure separately. The
results remain qualitatively similar, with precision levels matching those from the baseline
specification in Table 3.3.
As the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, the world trade flows have recorded a large
fall commonly referred to as the Great Trade Collapse (Bems et al. (2013)). As our sample
period (2000−2011) includes the trade collapse, we test whether the main result holds when
the sample is truncated only to the pre-crisis period 2000− 2008. The results in col.(3) are
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Strict exogeneity test as in Wooldridge (2010).
Dep. variable: natural log of unit values
of exports at product-exporter-year level.
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered
at exporter-industry-year level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
again qualitatively similar to the baseline results. Interestingly, the coefficient on the forward
linkages increases. Finally in col.(4) we present the specification in which we drop all the
country-year varying control variables and instead we include a full set of product-exporter,
product-year and exporter-year fixed effects. In such a specification, the threat of a potential
omitted variables problem is minimized and reduced to the variables varying at the product-
exporter-year level. Again, the coefficients on the forward linkage remain qualitatively similar
to the baseline and although of a slightly reduced magnitude, it remains strongly significant
and positive. On the other hand, the backward linkage coefficient is much smaller and is
estimated with a lower precision (significance at a 10% level).
3.3.2 Additional Results
Not all production chains are equal and not all of them could bring along the same prospects
of the exports upgrade. There exists an extensive literature on the technology and knowledge
transfer across countries (see Piermartini and Rubinova (2014) and Benz et al. (2014) among
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Table 3.6: GVC participation and export upgrade: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
multic. multic. before 2009 extened FE
backward linkage -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0560∗∗∗ -0.0100∗
(.00787) (.0118) (.00638)
forward linkage 0.0525∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0444∗∗
(.00763) (.0121) (.00664)
L.Exp. Value, log -0.0293∗∗∗ -0.0298∗∗∗ -0.0226∗∗∗ -0.0287∗∗∗
(.00107) (.00107) (.00137) (.000973)
L.Intm’s imports, log 0.0725∗∗∗ 0.0255∗∗∗ 0.0523∗∗∗ 0.00977
(.0107) (.0082) (.0126) (.00775)
L.GDP p.c., log 0.235∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(.0277) (.0268) (.0348)
L.Population, log -0.155∗ -0.104 -0.209∗
(.0868) (.0866) (.126)
L.Corp. tax -0.175∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.419∗∗∗
(.0593) (.0594) (.0711)
L.FDI to GDP -0.000274∗∗∗ -0.000329∗∗∗ -0.000208
(.0000988) (.0000959) (.0002)
Product-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter-Year FE No No No Yes
Observations 1294737 1294737 897883 1390010
R2-adj. .91 .91 .92 .91
Dep. variable: natural log of unit values of exports at product-exporter-year level. Standard
errors (in parentheses) clustered at exporter-industry-year level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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others) and it reports large and positive productivity effects that are associated with FDI
and GVCs-related trade for the firms located in the developing South. In order to investigate
the origin behind the baseline coefficients from the previous sections, we study the role of the
specific groups of countries and sectors within buying and selling GVCs links. Intuitively,
sourcing inputs from a more technologically advanced countries or selling components to
richer economies is more likely to positively affect the unit values of the exports. In a
similar manner, supplying inputs to high-tech sectors or sourcing the inputs from knowledge
intensive services sectors could bring about more room for quality upgrade. We therefore
decompose backward and forward GVCs participation indices and re-estimate Eq.(3.2.3)
by taking into account only the value added sold to or sourced from a selected groups of
countries or selected sector groupings. In detail, we obtain the narrow GVCs indices as
follows:
























where L and J stand for the countries’ or sectors’ groupings. L would contain 4 categories:
(i) low income, (ii) middle income and (iii) high income economies14 and (iv) G515. J would
consist of 2 main sector groupings: (i) high-tech sectors and (ii) low-tech sectors. For the
backward linkages I would additionally distinguish sourcing from (iii) services sectors and
(iv) knowledge intensive services (KI services). The sector classification into low-tech and
high-tech sectors based on Branstetter and Saggi (2011) classification16.
Destination country and sector
In Tables 3.7 and 3.15 in the Appendix we investigate the impact of the destination country
taking into account the exporter development level as well as different product characteristics
14I classify income groups accordingly to the the World Bank classification as of 2000. As a robustness
check an alternative classification accordingly to GDP p.c. thresholds was tested (low income lower than
6000 USD, middle income between 6000 USD and 20000 USD and high income greater then 20000USD),
but it did not later the results
15G5 is defined as the group of the most technologically advanced countries, the world leaders in the R&
D expenditure to GDP. It consists of United States, United Kingdom, Japan, France and Germany.
16An alternative classification into high-tech and low-tech industries by the OECD (2011) was also ex-
plored, but it did not change any of the results.
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Table 3.7: Export unit values and GVCs participation: destination countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val.
forward linkage HI 0.0410∗∗∗
(.0116)
forward HI x LMI 0.0410∗∗∗
(.00962)
forward HI x INT 0.0205∗
(.0112)
forward HI x LMI x INT -0.0250∗∗
(.0101)
forward linkage MI 0.0352∗∗∗
(.00764)
forward MI x LMI 0.00189
(.00979)
forward MI x INT -0.0332∗∗∗
(.00819)
forward MI x LMI x INT 0.00111
(.0101)
forward linkage LI 0.0352∗∗∗
(.00764)
forward LI x LMI 0.00189
(.00979)
forward LI x INT -0.0332∗∗∗
(.00819)
forward LI x LMI x INT 0.00111
(.0101)
forward linkage G5 0.0163
(.0117)
forward G5 x LMI 0.0459∗∗∗
(.011)
forward G5 x INT 0.0119
(.0114)
forward G5 x LMI x INT -0.0274∗∗
(.0112)
backward linkage -0.0839∗∗∗ -0.0393∗∗∗ -0.0393∗∗∗ -0.0600∗∗∗
(.00957) (.00757) (.00757) (.00885)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1310684 1310684 1310684 1310684
R2-adj. .91 .91 .91 .91
Dep. variable: natural log of unit values of exports at product-exporter-year level. LMI
dummy is equal to 1 for the low and middle income countries. Country development level
level assigned after World Bank classification as of 2000. INT is equal to 1 for the inter-
-mediate goods. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at exporter-industry-year level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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(intermediate vs. final good, differentiated vs. homogeneous good). In columns (1), (2), (3)
and (4) we study the effect of the forward linkages when selling to high income, middle
income, low income and G5 countries (resp.).
First, the results in Table 3.7 suggest that the destination markets behind the positive
impact of GVCs participation on export upgrade are the high income countries. The overall
effect of selling within GVCs to the middle and low income economies is almost negligible,
both for the developed and developing country exporters (col.(2) and col.(3)). Second,
although the impact of forward GVCs participation on unit values of exports is positive
both for the intermediates and final goods, it is greater for the latter, irrespective of the
destination market characteristics. Third, the results suggest that there is a premium in
export prices for the exporters from the developing countries (as compared to their rich
economies peers) when selling to the rich destinations, and technologically advanced G5
destinations in particular. Finally, accounting for the product differentiation does not alter
qualitatively the results (Table 3.15 in the Appendix). We still observe that the main driver of
the positive link between export upgrade and selling linkages are the rich and technologically
advanced destination markets (high income economies and G5). However, we can observe
that the forward GVCs linkages lead to increases in unit values of exports also when selling
to low and middle income destination, yet only for the differentiated products.
In Table 3.8 we focus on the impact of sector of destination. In Col. (1) we report
the impact of selling linkages on the unit values of exports when the destination sector is
a high-tech. The developed countries see a positive impact on export prices when selling
intermediates to the high-tech sectors, there is no impact on the final goods (1pp increase in
the forward participation triggers a 0.05% increase in unit values of intermediates’ exports).
Interestingly, for the developing countries the high-tech destination sector has an impact on
both the unit values of intermediate and final good exports, with a slightly greater coefficient
for the final goods (0.0774 for the final goods vs.0.0774 + 0.0468 − 0.059 = 0.0652 for the
intermediates). Forward linkages have no impact on unit values of exports in the developed
countries when the destination sector is low-tech (col.(2)). Yet for the developing countries
a 1pp increase in the forward GVCs participation brings about 0.05% increase in unit values
of final goods exports and 0.01% increase in unit values of intermediates. In col. (3) and
(4) we report the coefficients on the forward participation accounting for the differentiated
and homogeneous goods division. Forward linkages impact stronger the non-differentiated
goods across developing countries and both the direction and magnitude of this effect is
similar for high-tech and low-tech industries (1pp increase in forward linkage results in and
increase of 0.02% in export unit values of differentiated goods and an increase of 0.04% for
the non-differentiated goods). For the developing subsample also both low-tech and high-
tech destinations of forward linkages influence positively the export unit values. However,
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Table 3.8: Export unit values and GVC participation: destination sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val.
forward linkage HT 0.0111
(.0151)
forward HT x LMI 0.0774∗∗∗
(.0134)
forward HT x INT 0.0468∗∗∗
(.0154)
forward HT x LMI x INT -0.0590∗∗∗
(.0136)
forward linkage LT 0.0184
(.0159)
forward LT x LMI 0.0533∗∗∗
(.0129)
forward LT x INT 0.0176
(.0163)
forward LT x LMI x INT -0.0424∗∗∗
(.0128)
forward linkage HT 0.0673∗∗∗
(.0129)
forward HT x LMI 0.0152
(.0111)
forward HT x DIFF -0.0431∗∗∗
(.0142)
forward HT x LMI x DIFF 0.0410∗∗∗
(.0121)
forward linkage LT 0.0460∗∗∗
(.0132)
forward LT x LMI 0.00568
(.0113)
forward LT x DIFF -0.0249∗
(.0144)
forward LT x LMI x DIFF 0.0293∗∗
(.0117)
backward linkage -0.0669∗∗∗ -0.0942∗∗∗ -0.0660∗∗∗ -0.0926∗∗∗
(.00937) (.0104) (.00994) (.0109)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1310684 1310684 1182710 1182710
R2-adj. .91 .91 .91 .91
Dep. variable: natural log of unit values of exports at product-exporter-year level. LMI
dummy is equal to 1 for the low and middle income countries. Country development level
level assigned after World Bank classification as of 2000. INT is equal to 1 for the inter-
-mediate goods. DIFF is equal to 1 for the differentiated goods (Rauch classification)
HT and LT label high-tech and low-tech sectors, respectively. Standard errors (in paren-
-theses) clustered at exporter-industry-year level.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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in the case of the export prices of the differentiated goods sold to high-tech industries,
the magnitude of the effect is twice of the size of the coefficients for the high-tech non-
differentiated and all low-tech destinations.
Source country and sector
In Table 3.9 we investigate whether the source country level of development has an effect on
the relationship between GVCs backward participation and unit values of exports. The re-
sults reported in Table 3.9 confirm the negative association between sourcing within GVCs
and export prices. Additionally, we find that the negative relationship between the ex-
port prices and backward GVCs participation is not concentrated within a single group of
countries. Sourcing from high-income economies, low or middle income economies has quali-
tatively the same negative impact on export unit values. Whereas for the backward linkages
from the rich and technologically advanced countries the results suggest no statistically sig-
nificant differences between the export prices of final goods and intermediates (col.(1) and
col.(4)), we observe that sourcing from low and middle income economies results in lower
unit values of exports of intermediates only (col.(2) and col.(3)). This finding suggests that
at least a part of the negative effect of backward GVC participation on the export prices
we find is possibly due to the internationalization and competition forces interplay. It can
happen that as a given sector becomes more open to international competition, foreign part-
ners put pressure on home firms both in the export and input markets. Firms in response
to competition seek for the cost economies and source more intensively from the low-cost
locations while at the same time reducing prices in their export markets.
There is an interesting side-finding regarding the backward sourcing from the services
sectors. There are many empirical studies stressing the increasing importance of services in-
puts for the manufacturing productivity and our findings seem to corroborate this evidence.
Despite the overall negative impact of the backward linkages on the unit values of exports,
we find a strong and positive impact of foreign sourcing from services sectors (and in par-
ticular knowledge intensive services sectors) in the developing countries (Table 3.10, col.(3)
and col.(4)). We find no positive effects across developed economies, which is no surprise
as the high income countries typically rely on the domestic supply of quality services and
they are often themselves net exporters of services. Accounting for the differentiated/non-
differentiated products division does not alter the main results of this subsection and for the
sake of brevity the results are reported in Table 3.16 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.9: Export unit values and GVC participation: source country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val.
backward linkage HI -0.0500∗∗∗
(.00977)
backward HI x LMI 0.0233∗∗
(.0104)
backward HI x INT -0.00141
(.0106)
backward HI x LMI x INT -0.00463
(.0109)
backward linkage MI -0.00570
(.00773)
backward MI x LMI -0.0000637
(.00871)
backward MI x INT -0.0248∗∗∗
(.00832)
backward MI x LMI x INT 0.000239
(.00867)
backward linkage LI -0.00570
(.00773)
backward LI x LMI -0.0000637
(.00871)
backward LI x INT -0.0248∗∗∗
(.00832)
backward LI x LMI x INT 0.000239
(.00867)
backward linkage G5 -0.0416∗∗∗
(.00951)
backward G5 x LMI 0.0119
(.0111)
backward G5 x INT -0.000476
(.0104)
backward G5 x LMI x INT -0.00126
(.0116)
forward linkage 0.0708∗∗∗ 0.0653∗∗∗ 0.0653∗∗∗ 0.0690∗∗∗
(.00843) (.0079) (.0079) (.00788)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1310684 1310684 1310684 1310684
R2-adj. .91 .91 .91 .91
Dep. variable: natural log of unit values of exports at product-exporter-year level. LMI
dummy is equal to 1 for the low and middle income countries. Country development level
level assigned after World Bank classification as of 2000. INT is equal to 1 for the inter-
-mediate goods. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at exporter-industry-year level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.10: Export unit values and GVCs participation: source sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val.
backward linkage HT -0.0576∗∗∗
(.0121)
backward HT x LMI 0.00597
(.0116)
backward HT x INT 0.00517
(.0116)
backward HT x LMI x INT -0.0105
(.0115)
backward linkage LT -0.0432∗∗∗
(.0156)
backward LT x LMI 0.00214
(.0131)
backward LT x INT -0.0165
(.0147)
backward LT x LMI x INT 0.00212
(.013)
backward linkage Services -0.121∗∗∗
(.0152)
backward Services x LMI 0.233∗∗
(.0112)
backward Services x INT 0.00517
(.014)
backward Services x LMI x INT -0.0174
(.0115)
backward linkage KI Services -0.121∗∗∗
(.0141)
backward KI Services x LMI 0.327∗∗∗
(.011)
backward KI Services x INT 0.0161
(.0134)
backward KI Services x LMI x INT -0.0265∗∗
(.0113)
forward linkage 0.0638∗∗∗ 0.0447∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗
(.00864) (.00927) (.00853) (.00848)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1310684 1310684 1310684 1310684
R2-adj. .91 .91 .91 .91
Dep. variable: natural log of unit values of exports at product-exporter-year level. LMI dummy
is equal to 1 for the low and middle income countries. Country development level assigned after
World Bank classification as of 2000. INT is equal to 1 for the intermediate goods. KI services
stand for the knowledge intensive services (OECD classification). HT and LT label high-tech and
low-tech sectors, respectively. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at exporter-industry-year
level.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.3.3 Import Unit Values
As extensively reported in the previous sections we find a strong and robust positive as-
sociation between forward/selling GVCs linkages and export unit values and a less robust
negative association between backward/buying linkages and export prices. However, insofar
we cannot claim that the increase or decrease in the export unit values is surely due to an
increase or decrease in the export quality. It can well be that firms selling within the global
production networks expand their market access to richer, more technologically advanced
markets and increase mark-ups instead of upgrading quality. Conversely, the negative im-
pact of the backward participation we find may not necessarily point to export downgrade
but can be a result of a competition being intensified by an increasing internationalization of
sectors. As a consequence firms facing competition in both export and input markets search
for cheaper inputs and reduce their export markups, irrespective of quality.
In order to shed some light whether our results are driven by the export quality changes or
the fluctuations in the mark-ups, we investigate at the import unit values.
The recent literature emphasizes the importance of quality inputs for the production of
Table 3.11: Unit values of imported intermediates and GVC participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1 L2 L3
forward linkage 0.0233∗∗ 0.0284∗∗ 0.0236∗∗ 0.0274∗∗ 0.0250∗∗ 0.0230∗∗
(.00563) (.00738) (.00644) (.00819) (.00725) (.00915)
forward l. x LMI -0.0174∗ -0.0192 -0.0203∗∗ -0.0213∗ -0.0238∗∗ -0.0284∗∗
(.00917) (.0118) (.00953) (.0119) (.0104) (.0128)
forward l. x DIFF -0.00852 -0.00524 -0.0164∗
(.00769) (.00816) (.00894)
forward l. x DIFF x LMI 0.00317 0.00181 0.0113
(.0126) (.0127) (.0137)
backward linkage 0.00808 0.0112 -0.0267∗∗∗ -0.0239∗∗ -0.0454∗∗∗ -0.0445∗∗∗
(.00817) (.0102) (.00964) (.012) (.0112) (.0134)
backward l. x LMI -0.0234∗∗ -0.0212 -0.0187∗ 0.00181 -0.0164 0.0228
(.0104) (.0135) (.0108) (.0096) (.0127) (.0154)
backward l. x DIFF -0.00825 -0.00888 -0.00405
(.0113) (.0131) (.0152)
backward l. x DIFF x LMI -0.00449 -0.00495 -0.0140
(.0147) (.0143) (.0155)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1175374 1140785 1061217 1030141 949365 921629
R2-adj. .94 .93 .94 .94 .94 .94
Dep. variable: natural log of unit values of imports of intermediate goods at product-exporter-year level. Col. (1)− (2),
(3)− (4), (5)− (6) present results with a 1-year, 2-year and 3-year lagged GVC indicators, respectively. LMI dummy
is equal to 1 for the low and middle income countries. Country development level assigned after the World Bank
classification as of 2000. DIFF is equal to 1 for differentiated (Rauch classification). Standard errors (in parentheses)
clustered at exporter-industry-year level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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quality outputs. Following this insight, we re-estimate Eq.(3.2.3), but with the import unit
values of the intermediate goods as the dependent variable (data obtained from TUV Cepii
database, collapsed at the product-importer-year level). To corroborate the hypothesis that
the sectors that sell more within GVCs networks indeed enjoyed a quality upgrade, we would
expect to see also an increase in the unit values of imported intermediates in the respective
sectors.
In Table 3.11 we present the estimation results. In columns (1),(3) and (5) we report the
baseline specification as in Eq.(3.2.3) enriched with developing country dummy, respectively
for the specification with a 1, 2 and 3 year lags for the GVCs indicators. In columns
(2),(4) and (6) we present the outcomes for the specifications additionally controlling for the
differentiated goods.
We find that the sectors that are more intensively selling within the GVCs have recorded a
positive and significant increase in the unit values of imported intermediates. A 1pp increase
in forward GVCs participation is related to a 0.02% up to 0.03% increase in intermediate
imports’ unit values and the estimates are significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on
the interaction with developing dummy is significant and negative, suggesting a smaller size
of the increase is smaller for the low and middle income economies. Accounting for the
differentiated products does not change qualitatively the results, with the exception of the
specification with a 3 year lag, where the overall sign of the forward GVCs linkage turns
negative (col.(6)).
As for the backward GVCs participation, we find a negative and significant relationship,
yet a less robust than in the case of the forward linkages. A 1pp increase in the backward
GVCs participation is associated with a 0.02% up to 0.045% (col.(1) and col.(5)) decline in
the import unit values of the intermediates. The impact is of a greater magnitude for the
developing economies in the specifications with 1 and 2 year lag of the GVCs indicators as
suggested by the significant and negative interaction term (col.(1) and col.(3)).
Summing up, we document that the increase in the unit values of exports associated
with the increase in the forward GVCs participation is at the same time accompanied by
an increase in the unit values of intermediate imports. We would interpret this evidence
as suggestive for a quality upgrade effect as opposed to a mere increase in the mark-ups.
In contrast, the statistically weaker negative impact of the backward GVCs participation
is found to be accompanied by a decrease in the import values of the intermediates. This
finding could admit two explanations. It could be that due to competition forces induced by
high backward GVCs participation in a sector, firms compete both in the export and input
markets and source cheaper inputs from abroad. Subsequently, the decrease in the export
prices could be the outcome of the downgraded quality or just a decrease in the export prices
due to the reduced production costs. A further exploration of this possibilities would call for
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an analysis at the firm-level data and we see it as a promising avenue for the future research.
3.4 Conclusion
The question of export composition, sophistication and its upgrade as well as the drive to
successfully join the global value chains are the topics at the heart of both national and
global policy debate. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this debate by shedding some
light on the relationship between export quality and GVCs participation.
Our analysis suggests that intensified selling GVCs linkages might have a potential to
lead to export quality upgrade. Based on the International Output-Input Tables (OECD
ICIO) we construct the indices of forward and backward GVCs participation and relate them
to the unit values of exports on the product level. We find a strong and persistent positive
impact fo selling GVCs linkages on the export unit values. This effect is stronger for the
developing countries and driven by the selling to rich and technologically advanced markets.
We additionally find that this effect is accompanied by a simultaneous increase in the unit
values of intermediates imports. In line with the view that high quality inputs are required
for high quality outputs, we interpret this outcomes as a corroborating evidence for export
quality upgrade.
On the other hand, we find a negative, although a less robust, association between back-
ward GVCs linkages and unit values of exports export. There is no single group of source
countries or sectors driving the results. We report no statistically significant differences be-
tween the export prices of final goods and intermediates for the developed countries, however,
we observe that sourcing from low and middle income economies leads to lower unit values of
exports of intermediate goods only. This finding coupled with the documented simultaneous
decrease in the import values of the intermediates could admit two explanations. It could be
that due to high backward GVCs participation in a sector, firms compete both in the export
and input markets, and seek to source cheaper inputs from abroad. Subsequently, the de-
crease in the export prices could be the outcome of the downgraded quality or just a decrease
in export price accompanied by reduced production costs, leaving the mark-ups unaltered.
We see the exploration of this finding as a promising avenue for the future research.
The most robust of our estimated coefficients on the forward GVCs participation over
the period between 2000 and 2011 correspond to a 22.6% increase in the export unit values.
Although we do not claim that the GVCs forward participation is the only or the most
important factor behind the export upgrade in the studied countries, our results point to the
importance of promotion of prospective value chains, i.e. related to technologically advanced
sectors and rich markets, in particular for the developing economies.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Tables
Table 3.12: Baseline Country Sample
High Income Upper-middle Income Low Income
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Classification after the World Bank as of year 2000. Oil-exporters excluded.
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Table 3.14: Summary statistics
Variable; source mean sd min max N∗
Product-exporter-year variables
Unit Values (log); TUV Cepii 9.046158 1.94461 0.0185994 23.98577 1687398
Export Value (log); BACI Cepii 6.804349 3.076151 0 18.23779 1687398
Sector-exporter-year variables
backward l. (log); OECD ICIO 7.17706 1.692971 2.203347 12.06924 10584
forward l. (log); OECD ICIO 5.544036 3.907034 -9.954597 10.91124 10584
Imp. Dom. Cons. (log); OECD ICIO 4.465136 5.911716 -20.48382 10.14911 10584
Country-year variables
GDP per capita (log); WDI World Bank 10.04889 0.6704086 7.223172 11.22404 595
Population (log); WDI World Bank 9.773626 1.577765 5.370638 13.90232 595
Corp. tax rate; World Tax Database, 0.2846419 0.076677 0.1 0.4125 535
KPMG, OECD
FDI to GDP; UNCTAD 5.150957 17.4631 0.0068569 499.6003 595
∗ Number of distinct observations.
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3.5.2 Regression Appendix
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Table 3.15: Export unit values and GVCs participation: destination country (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val.
forward linkage HI 0.0654∗∗∗
(.0115)
forward HI x LMI 0.0107
(.00948)
forward HI x DIFF -0.0276∗∗
(.0116)
forward HI x LMI x DIFF 0.0238∗∗
(.00969)
forward linkage MI 0.00161
(.00673)
forward MI x LMI 0.0113
(.00836)
forward MI x DIFF 0.0224∗∗∗
(.00757)
forward MI x LMI x DIFF -0.0106
(.00883)
forward linkage LI 0.00161
(.00673)
forward LI x LMI 0.0113
(.00836)
forward LI x DIFF 0.0224∗∗∗
(.00757)
forward LI x LMI x DIFF -0.0106
(.00883)
forward linkage G5 0.0309∗∗∗
(.00965)
forward G5 x LMI 0.0119
(.00883)
forward G5 x DIFF -0.0154
(.0105)
forward G5 x LMI x DIFF 0.0267∗∗∗
(.00975)
backward linkage -0.0791∗∗∗ -0.0424∗∗∗ -0.0424∗∗∗ -0.0582∗∗∗
(.00982) (.00793) (.00793) (.00917)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1182710 1182710 1182710 1182710
R2-adj. .91 .91 .91 .91
Dep. variable: natural log of unit values of exports at product-exporter-year level. LMI
dummy is equal to 1 for the low and middle income countries. Country development level
level assigned after World Bank classification as of 2000. DIFF is equal to 1 for the diff-
-erentiated goods (Rauch classification). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at
exporter-industry-year level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Chapter3 115
Table 3.16: Export unit values and GVC participation: source country (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val.
backward linkage HI -0.0469∗∗∗
(.0109)
backward HI x LMI 0.0154
(.00975)
backward HI x DIFF -0.0120
(.0108)
backward HI x LMI x DIFF 0.00508
(.0103)
backward linkage MI -0.0284∗∗∗
(.0066)
backward MI x LMI 0.00340
(.00728)
backward MI x DIFF 0.0128∗
(.00742)
backward MI x LMI x DIFF -0.00279
(.0075)
backward linkage LI -0.0284∗∗∗
(.0066)
backward LI x LMI 0.00340
(.00728)
backward LI x DIFF 0.0128∗
(.00742)
backward LI x LMI x DIFF -0.00279
(.0075)
backward linkage G5 -0.0359∗∗∗
(.0089)
backward G5 x LMI 0.00546
(.00903)
backward G5 x DIFF -0.0107
(.00969)
backward G5 x LMI x DIFF 0.00803
(.0104)
forward linkage 0.0752∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0717∗∗∗
(.00878) (.00823) (.00823) (.00827)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1182710 1182710 1182710 1182710
R2-adj. .91 .91 .91 .91
Dep. variable: natural log of unit values of exports at product-exporter-year level. LMI
dummy is equal to 1 for the low and middle income countries. Country development level
level assigned after World Bank classification as of 2000. DIFF is equal to 1 for the diff-
-erentiated goods (Rauch classification). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at
exporter-industry-year level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.17: Export unit values and GVCs participation: source sector (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val. Unit Val.
backward linkage HT -0.0470∗∗∗
(.00964)
backward HT x LMI -0.00602
(.00929)
backward HT x DIFF -0.0105
(.01)
backward HT x LMI x DIFF 0.00742
(.00992)
backward linkage LT -0.0505∗∗∗
(.0121)
backward LT x LMI -0.000305
(.00965)
backward LT x DIFF -0.00177
(.0119)
backward LT x LMI x DIFF 0.00569
(.0108)
backward linkage Services -0.104∗∗∗
(.0134)
backward Services x LMI 0.241∗∗
(.0986)
backward Services x DIFF -0.0167
(.0121)
backward Services x LMI x DIFF 0.00979
(.0102)
backward linkage KI Services -0.0919∗∗∗
(.0129)
backward KI Services x LMI 0.398∗∗∗
(.0101)
backward KI Services x DIFF -0.0251∗∗
(.0119)
backward KI Services x LMI x DIFF 0.0162
(.0102)
forward linkage 0.0655∗∗∗ 0.0466∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0671∗∗∗
(.0091) (.00964) (.009) (.00893)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1182710 1182710 1182710 1182710
R2-adj. .91 .91 .91 .91
Dep. variable: natural log of unit values of exports at product-exporter-year level. LMI dummy
is equal to 1 for the low and middle income countries. Country development level assigned after
World Bank classification as of 2000. DIFF is equal to 1 for the differentiated goods (Rauch
classification). KI services stand for the knowledge intensive services (OECD classification).
HT and LT label high-tech and low-tech sectors, respectively. Standard errors (in parentheses)
clustered at exporter-industry-year level.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
